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I. INTRODUCTION
On December 27, 1988, President Ronald Reagan issued a Proclamation
extending the U.S. territorial sea from three-to-twelve nautical miles for international
purposes.! Reagan was advised by the Department of Justice2 that, by virtue of his
role as the sole representative of the United States in foreign affairs, he had the
power to acquire sovereignty over this territory, despite the absence of any express
constitutional or statutory authority. In his analysis of the impact of this proclana-
tion on federal statutes regulating offshore waters and federal-state jurisdictional
divisions, Douglas W. Kmiec of the Department of Justice recognized that intent of
Congress is the key factor in determining whether domestic statutes would be
affected by this territorial sea extension. In relation to the Coastal Zone Manage-
ment Acte (CZMA), he concluded that the expansion of the territorial sea would not
extend the Act's coverage In an apparent attempt to prevent the proclamation
from expanding coastal state jurisdiction, former President Reagan included a
proviso stating that "[n]othing in this Proclamation: (a) extends or otherwise alters
existing Federal or State law or any jurisdiction, rights, legal interests, or obligations
derived therefrom....
The constitutionality of this Proclamation has come under fire from several
commentators6 who argue that acquisition of territory is a legislative rather than a
presidential power. Others have argued that even if the President had the authority
1. Proclamation No. 5928, 54 Fed. Reg. 777 (1989) [hereinafter Territorial Sea Proclamation].
2. Douglas W. Kmiec, Legal Issues Raised by the Proposed Presidential Proclamation to Extend the
Territorial Sea, 1 TEER. SEA J. 1, 16 (1990), reprinting a memorandum prepared for Abraham D. Sofaer,
Legal Adviser, Department of State, from the Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Department of Justice
(October 4, 1988).
3. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-64 (1988).
4. Kmiec, supra note 2, at 37.
5. Territorial Sea Proclamation, supra note 1.
6. See infra notes 22-57 and accompanying text.
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to assert sovereignty over an extended territorial sea, the proviso quoted above is
ineffective absent express congressional approval.7
These contrasting views illustrate the ambiguous nature of the ocean manage-
ment regime now governing the territorial sea. The Proclamation has created a zone
without clear jurisdictional authority, where a case-by-case analysis is needed to
determine the rights, duties, and responsibilities of citizens, the government, and
foreign nationals and nations. This situation is not only inefficient, but absurd.
Although Congress recently legislated that the territorial sea expansion does not
apply to the CZMA,8 questions remain, for instance, whether jurisdiction is
conferred under the Endangered Species Act in the three-to-twelve mile zone or if
several other protectionary measures9 can be applied throughout a twelve-nautical-
mile territorial sea.
This article examines these constitutional and statutory ambiguities, considers
historical and current federal-state tensions surrounding the management of nonliving
and living resources, and suggests several alternative approaches Congress could take
to produce a comprehensive ocean management regime for the United States. It
asserts that affirmative Congressional action is preferable to resorting to the judicial
7. See infra notes 24,28, 31, 45-48, 54, 57, and accompanying text. Congress did not expressly give
effect to the proviso in either of the sessions of the 101st Congress; H.R. 1405 (Section 4) would have
made it clear that "[each state's] jurisdiction or authority ... shall not [be] extend[ed] beyond ... [the]
previous geographical limits by the extension of the territorial sea of the United States."
8. The 1990 Coastal Zone Management Act Amendments struck references to "the United States
territorial sea" (16 U.S.C. § 1453(1)), and inserted in lieu thereof "the outer limit of State title and
ownership under the Submerged Lands Act..."
Furthermore, § 1456(c)(3)(B) was amended to require that any area leased under OCSLA "affecting
any [land use or water use in] land or water use or natural resource of the coastal zone of the state..
. must be consistent ... [with] the enforceable policies of' the coastal state's management plan. This
amendment effectively overturned Secretary of the Interior v. California, 464 U.S. 312 (1984) (holding
that the act does not apply to oil and gas leases) because of the undeniable impact leasing will have on
the natural resources of the coastal zone.
Section 1456(d) was also amended to clarify the Act's application to federal activities whether "in
or outside of the coastal zone" which affect any land or water use or natural resource of the coastal zone.
9. Among other statutes made ambiguous by the Proclamation are the Ocean Dumping Act; the Deep
Water Ports Act; the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea; the Prevention of
Pollution from Ships; Shore Protection from Municipal or Commercial Waste; and the Independent Safety
Board Act. See infra notes 61-161 and accompanying text.
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process and is the best way to resolve these problems. Thus it is in the best interests
of coastal states to push for legislation that would clarify the nature of this zone.
I. THE CONSITUTIONALITY OF THE UNILATERAL
PRESIDENTIAL EXTENSION OF THE U.S. TERRITORIAL SEA
TO TWELVE NAUTICAL MILES
A. Introduction
Several commentators have examined the constitutionality of President Reagan's
unilateral executive action qxtending the U.S. territorial sea." Their analyses raise
questions regarding the President's authority to exercise power in this fashion. This
section summarizes the arguments supporting unilateral acquisition of territory by
the President, and contrasts these with the arguments for a more restrictive
interpretation of Presidential powers.
B. Sources of Presidential Power
1. Foreign Affairs Power
Although the most legally secure method of extending the territorial sea would
be by treaty, the President's authority to act alone through a Presidential Proclama-
tion has been justified by virtue of the President's constitutional role as the sole
representative of the United States in foreign relations.1 Although the Constitution
does not specifically address the power to acquire territory on behalf of the United
States, the Supreme Court in Mormon Church v. United States2 stated that the
powers of the several branches of government to make war, to make treaties, and to
10. See e.g., Kmiec, supra, note 2; Jack H. Archer and Joan M. Bondareff, The Role of Congress in
Establishing US. Sovereignty Over the Expanded Territorial Sea, 1 TRR. SEA J. 117 (1990); Bums, A
Discussion of the Constitutional Issues Raised by Executive Extension of the Territorial Sea Limit
(unpublished student paper prepared for Second-year Seminar at the University of Hawaii, William S.
Richardson School of Law, April, 1990).
11. Kmiec, supra note 2.
12. 136 U.S. 1, 42 (1890); see also American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 542 (1828)
("The Constitution confers absolutely on the government of the Union, the powers of making war, and
of making treaties; consequently, that government possesses the power of acquiring territory, either by
conquest or by treaty.")
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govern the territory of the union provide the necessary authority. The Justice
Department focused on practical considerations to support the President's authority
to assert sovereignty: "As our representative in foreign affairs, the President is best
situated to announce to other nations that the United States asserts sovereignty over
territory previously unclaimed by another nation." 3
The same constitutionally derived authority that arguably allows the President
to acquire territory by discovery and occupation could conceivably be cited as
additional justification of Presidential power to proclaim sovereignty over an
extended territorial sea. This power was judicially recognized in Louisiana 1, 14
where the Court stated that the President has the power "to determine how far this
country will claim territorial rights in the marginal sea as against other nations.""
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.'6 also seems to authorize Presidential
assertion of sovereignty in the absence of a specifically enumerated constitutional
power."
The only definitive constitutionally-based power authorizing Congress to acquire
territory, on the other hand, derives from the constitutional power of Congress to
admit new states into the union. Congress has never asserted jurisdiction or
sovereignty over the territorial sea on behalf of the United States.' Congressional
13. Kmiec, supra note 2, at 16.
14. United States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1 (1960).
15. Id. at 34.
16. 299 U.S. 304 (1935).
17. The President's foreign relations power arises from both "the inherent sovereign authority over
foreign relations [obtained] when [the United States] secured its independence from Great Britain"
(Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 318), and the fact the President exercises many of the powers formerly vested
in the British crown that are not enumerated in the Constitution as belonging to Congress. See Kmiec,
supra note 2, at 6 n.16.
In Curtiss-Wright, the court stated that "[t]he broad statement that the federal government can
exercise no powers except those specifically enumerated in the Constitution, and such implied powers as
are necessary and proper to carry into effect the enumerated powers, is categorically true only in respect
of our internal affairs." 299 U.S. at 318.
18. Kmiec, supra note 2, at 18.
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assertions of jurisdiction or sovereignty in areas of the ocean' 9 were all enacted
after initial Presidential proclamations on behalf of the United States.2" The Justice
Department argues that this history illustrates the operation of constitutional
restraints on the power of Congress to proclaim jurisdiction or sovereignty over
offshore areas.'
The propriety of a President's unilateral assertion of "sovereignty" (as opposed
to claiming "jurisdiction" alone) over this area is, however, not free from doubt.2
One commentator has argued that neither express nor implied constitutional authority
for unilateral executive extension of the United States' territorial sea exists. 3
Under this view, the extension of the territorial sea limit can be properly achieved
only by congressional action, whether or not in conjunction with an executive
initiative. The broad language used by Justice Sutherland in Curtiss-Wright relating
to Presidential powers can be characterized as dicta because the facts of the case
reveal that Congress gave the President the power to ban the sale of arms to certain
countries. 4 Curtiss-Wright cannot be cited as holding that the President has
authority to exercise foreign affairs initiatives, such as asserting sovereignty over
new territory, in the absence of specifically enumerated constitutional power. The
implied powers justifying unilateral acquisition of territory by the President simply
do not apply to the territorial sea
19. Specifically, the Neutrality Act of 1794, 51 U.S.C. §6 (1988); other federal statutes relating to
customs authority, 14 U.S.C. § 89 (1988), and 19 U.S.C. § 1581 (1988); and the OCSLA, 43 U.S.C. §§
1331-56 (1988).
20. Kmiec, supra note 2, at 18 n.54.
21. Id. at 18 (at least for international purposes).
22. The advocates of Presidential authority acknowledge this doubt themselves. Id. at 36.
23. See, e.g., Bums, supra note 10, at 1.
24. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 319-20.
25. Other possible modes of acquiring territory are clearly inapplicable to the present territorial sea
extension. The most usual method of acquiring territory is through a treaty, but that approach requires
participation of the Senate. Purchase and cession are typically accomplished through a treaty. Conquest
cannot be relied upon because the necessary factors are not present; in The American Insurance Co. v.
Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Peters) 511, 542-43 (1828), the court found the holding of conquered territory to be
(continued...)
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The need for caution, secrecy, swift action, and specialized information in the
negotiation process (better accomplished by the President than by Congress)
generally justifies expansive foreign relations powers for the President. One critic
has found these concerns "simply inapplicable to the territorial sea issue," however,
because "[t]here is no need for secrecy, swift action or specialized information in
extending the territorial sea." 6 He further asserts that whether the President is best
situated to announce the assertion of U.S. sovereignty' is also irrelevant to the
question of how territory is actually acquired because the President could satisfy his
role in foreign affairs by simply announcing previously-made Congressional
decisions to the world.' If Presidential power is to be relied upon, therefore, it
must be found in other parts of our constitutional structure.
2. Commander-in-Chief
The apparent purpose of the territorial sea extension was to provide a greater
defense perimeter for the United States, specifically to keep foreign intelligence-
gathering and naval vessels farther off the coast of the United States. 9 Because
the U.S. Constitution places control of the nation's defenses in the Chief Executive,
unilateral Presidential action appears to be justified at first glance. The Territorial
Sea Proclamation, however, goes beyond merely establishing new boundaries
necessitated by modem technology. Although it might be argued that the President's
assertion of sovereignty over an extended territorial sea was not intended to intrude
25. (...continued)
only a temporary military occupation until a treaty is entered into. Furthermore, in Fleming & Marshall
v. Page, 50 U.S. (9 Howard) 603, 614 (1849), the Court held that extension of the boundaries of the
United States can be accomplished only through the treaty-making power or by legislative authority.
Annexation has never been exercised by the President alone, but has been utilized by Congress twice.
Bums, supra note 10, at 4-7.
26. Bums, supra note 10, at 11.
27. Kmiec, supra note 2, at 16.
28. Bums, supra note 10, at 16.
29. Archer and Bondareff, supra note 10, at 117. See also U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE, INTERNATION-
AL LAW SITUATION AND DOCUMENTS 603-604 (1957) (listing defensive sea areas established by the
President pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2152), cited in Kmiec, supra note 2, at II n.32.
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into legislative affairs," the President's powers as Commander-in-Chief do not
automatically confer authority to act without participation by Congress?'
3. Congressional Acquiescence
In the face of Congressional acquiescence, the Territorial Sea Proclamation
might be defensible as a valid executive acquisition of territory. The question
becomes whether Congressional action has been sufficient and timely. For example,
the initial assertion of jurisdiction over the territorial sea by Secretary of State
Thomas Jefferson in 1793 ripened into a claim of sovereignty over time, even
though such rights were not clear when the executive branch made its original
unilateral claim.32 It has been noted, however, that Congress acted quickly to
30. See Kmiec, supra note 2. The Department of Justice's interpretation of the effect of the
Presidential Proclamation on the Coastal Zone Management Act may not necessarily have been crucial
to the President's designs.
One commentator has stated that the language of the Proclamation prohibiting domestic impact
"avoids the awkward domestic political and legal consequences that would follow a unilateral Presidential
attempt to modify Congressional allocation of authority between federal and state governments concerning
the coastal zone." See Noyes, United States of America Presidential Proclamation No. 5928: A Twelve-
Mile Territorial Sea, 4 INT'L J. ESTuARNE & COASTI.. L. 142, 146 (1989).
Similarly, in the ABA's Law of the Sea Committee Newsletter, vol. 3, no. 2 (1989), Donald Carr
stated that the President "recognized that the domestic legislative consequences involved the authority of
Congress" (at 10) and that common sense suggested that each of the statutes should be considered
separately. According to Carr, therefore, the proclamation was merely an exercise of the President's
foreign affairs authority, leaving domestic legislation unchanged.
On the other hand, the Coastal States Organization has interpreted the President's attempted
limitation on domestic statute as going farther than the Justice Department was willing to go. Extension
of the Territorial Sea: Hearings on H.R. 1405 Before the Subcomm. on Oceanography and Great Lakes
of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 64, 70 (1989) (statement
of Chris Shafer, Chair, Coastal States Organization).
31. But see infra note 39 and preceding text for a potential argument to the contrary based on implied
"Nuclear Age" powers.
32. See Archer and Bondareff, supra note 10, at 126: "It is not clear whether Jefferson and the
Washington administration intended to assert U.S. jurisdiction to one sea league for defensive purposes
only orto acquire new territory subject to U.S. sovereignty three miles seaward." (Emphasis added.) See
also Kmiec, supra note 2, at 9 n. 24, quoting Oct. 16, 1793 letter of George Washington: "IThe extent
of Territorial jurisdiction at Sea, has not yet been fixed." Compare with Kmiec, supra note 2, at 17 n.51:
(continued...)
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affirm the Jefferson claim by passing the Neutrality Act of 1794."3 Passage of the
Submerged Lands Act in 1953 also suggests that Congress has not deferred to the
executive with regard to the territorial sea. Other historical events show that
Congress has not previously acquiesced in unilateral executive acquisition of
territory. Most United States' acquisitions have been accomplished by treaty.
Congress has twice asserted its own authority to acquire territory by annexing Texas
and Hawaii. Congress displayed an intention to participate in the acquisition of
territory through the Guano Islands Act of 1856. And the Senate has voted to cut
off funds for construction of military bases overseas as a means of protesting the
President's acquisition of those bases by executive agreement rather than by
treaty.34
Similarly, it does not appear that Congress has yielded to Presidential authority
as exercised in 1988. One commentator notes that the Territorial Sea Proclamation
is "in legal limbo until such time as Congress either passes legislation to give it
effect or fails to act, in which case their acquiescence would soon be interpreted as
impliedly authorizing the Proclamation to take effect. 3 5 Congressional failure to
act in the near future may lead to an interpretation of implied authorization of
32. (...continued)
There may be an argument that President Washington's unilateral assertion of sovereignty over
the original territorial sea is now underpinned by longstanding congressional acquies-
cence.... ITfhere is at least arguable recognition by the legislature of the President's power
in its explicit desire that the United States exercise full sovereignty over the territorial sea
claimed by our first president.
33. 51 U.S.C. §6 (1988).
34. Bums, supra note 10. See also, Protocol of a Conference Held at the Foreign Office, Dec. 9,
1850, 18 Stat. (Part 2) 325-26:
There is a third example of unilateral acquisition by the President by executive agreement.
In this regard, President Fillmore entered into an executive agreement in 1850 in which Great
Britain "cede[d] to the United States such portion of the Horseshoe Reef as may be found
requisite" for a lighthouse in Lake Erie near Buffalo.
5 TREATrs AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL Acms OF Tm UNIED STATES OF AMERICA 905-28 (H. Miller
ed. 1937) (describing the acquisition of Horseshoe Reef), reprinted in Kmiec, supra note 2, at 15 n.44.
35. Bums, supra note 10, at 32.
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executive power by acquiescence' The necessary time period for congressional
action is "probably very short."37 Although Congress has yet to pass legislation
implementing the Proclamation, its recent attention to this issue suggests that it does
not intend to acquiesce."
4. Nuclear Age Powers
In the nuclear age, the imminent and unpredictable threat to national security
interests suggests the need for broad Presidential authority in the defense of our
country. The President must be allowed to take swift action in response to nuclear
attack, because in such situations insufficient time will be available for Congress to
deliberate. This power cannot be cited as a source for unilateral Presidential action,
however, because no such immediate need exists for an extension of the territorial
sea. The Territorial Sea Proclamation is instead, a "momentous break with tradition
[that should have] require[d] lengthy debate at the highest levels of government."39
C. The Separation of Powers Issue
The constitutional structure on the foreign affairs power suggests that neither the
executive nor legislative branch was intended to have exclusive authority.
Uncertainty concerning the proper source of authority for asserting sovereignty over
an extended territorial sea creates a "classic separation of powers conflict."'  The
quintessential separation of powers case, Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
36. Id. at 22.
37. Id.
38. See supra note 8. The Coastal Zone Management Act reauthorization amendments illustrate the
fact Congress has not yielded authority to legislate with regard to domestic jurisdiction in the U.S.
territorial sea.
39. Bums, supra note 10, at 1.
40. Id. at 9.
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Sawyer,4 although primarily a domestic affairs case, can be validly used to
examine separation of powers conflicts in foreign affairs.42
Under the Youngstown framework, the President's unilateral extension of the
territorial sea falls in a twilight zone where he can rely only upon his independent
powers. Once in this zone, either (i) congressional inertia, indifference, or
acquiescence, or (ii) a consistent administrative policy can be said to authorize
executive action.43 The potential argument that the original territorial sea claim
represents a consistent administrative policy is not dispositive. The real issue is the
executive policy toward unilateral acquisition of territory. Proper consideration of
this issue necessitates an analysis of historical examples of U.S. territorial
acquisitions.
D. Historical Examples of Territorial Acquisition
1. Executive Acquisitions
The executive branch acted without participation by Congress in asserting the
original claim to the three-nautical-mile territorial sea in 1793 by President
Washington and Secretary of State Jefferson." Sovereignty is the "indispensable
concomitant" of a nation's territorial sea, however, and therefore prevents the
extension of the territorial sea (without changing the definition of "territorial sea"
itself) for jurisdictional purposes only.45
41. 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (The Steel Seizure Case).
42. See, e.g., GEOFFREY R. STONE Er AL., CONSTtrTIONAL LAW 414 (1986).
43. See e.g., Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965); and Haig v.
Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1980).
44. See supra note 32; Archer and Bondareff, supra note 10, at 124; and Bums, supra note 10, at 17.
Archer and Bondareff acknowledge the independent claim of territorial sea jurisdiction by the executive
branch, but qualify its precedential value by reference to its limited purposes: (1) to preserve U.S.
neutrality and (2) to provide "territorial protection." These authors also note that Congress acted quickly
to affirm the Jefferson claim by enacting the Neutrality Act of 1794. Bums also acknowledges the lack
of Congressional participation in the 1793 claim. He feels, however, that Jefferson's reference to
"Territorial jurisdiction at Sea" was not meant to be an assertion of sovereignty. (Emphasis added.)
45. Bums, supra note 10, at 11.
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Two examples of Presidential acquisition are Midway Islands and Wake Island,
both arguably accomplished by discovery and occupation." Such claims are not
dispositive of the issue, however. The Midway Islands claim was acted upon by
Congress after the annexation of Hawaii; thus the acquisition is traceable through the
Republic of Hawaii rather than to a claim based on discovery and occupation.
Similarly, the 1899 claim to Wake Island was acted upon by Congress, but not until
1934f Wake Island appears to be the only clear instance" when the executive
has asserted a right to acquire and govern territory without some color of legislative
approval. Nonetheless, some scholars argue that the discovery and occupation of
relatively small atolls and islands in the Pacific in the nineteenth century is irrelevant
to the unilateral Presidential extension of the territorial sea.49 Even if unilateral
executive action were assumed in these cases, their precedential value is diminished
substantially by analogy to the much more significant acquisitions of territory by
46. The precedential value of Wake Island is unclear because of a continuing controversy over true
ownership of the three atolls that make up Wake Island. See Heine & Anderson, Enen-Kio: Island of the
Kio Flower, 19 MtCRONESiAN REPORTER 34 (1971). Although the claim was dormant from 1885 to 1986,
the Marshall Islands claim the atolls as Enen-Kio, by virtue of discovery and traditional use centuries
prior to U.S. occupation. The Marshalls have no written ancient history with which to support their claim,
but Enen-Kio is claimed by one of their chiefs. The long, hard voyage to Enen-Kio was motivated by
fear, because Marshallese custom called for human sacrifice to provide bones to be used in the tattooing
process. Potential victims' lives were spared only if they could provide a substitute bone as strong as a
human bone. The wing of a large sea bird found on Enen-Kio was thus their only way to escape death.
The Marshallese apparently stopped going to Enen-Kio after the arrival of Christianity, but still feel
strongly that the atolls will forever be theirs.
Cf. D. LEFF, UNCLE SAM'S PACIFIC IsLErs (1940); and PACIFIC ISLANDS YEARBOOK (J. Carter ed.,
14th ed. 1981). The United States attempted to take formal possession of Wake Island on January 17,
1899, through the claim of Commander Edward D. Taussig of the U.S.S. Bennington. In a 1923 scientific
expedition, the only sign of life found was an abandoned Japanese feather gatherer's living site. In 1934,
Wake Island was formally placed under Navy Department jurisdiction and is now the responsibility of
the Air Force, which requires permission of its Hawaii office before any aircraft may land on the island.
Currently about 400 people live at Wake. A weather station and a branch of the National Oceanographic
and Atmospheric Administration are located there.
47. See Lawson Reno, The Power of the President to Acquire and Govern Territory, 9 GEo. WASH.
L. REV. 251, 255-75 (1941). Reno states that apparent executive assertion of sovereignty over Midway
and Wake was actually gained by virtue of the annexation of Hawaii by Congress.
48. But see supra note 46.
49. Archer and Bondareff, supra note 10, at 130.
16 TERRroRIAL SEA JouRNAL [Vol. 2:1
Congress of every other piece of territory in the United States;5" at most, "acquisi-
tion of the islands represents nothing more than an exception to the rule."'51
2. Congressional Acquisition52
The historical precedents of treaty acquisitions, 3 the annexations of Texas and
Hawaii, and the Guano Islands Act illustrate the existence of a congressional role in
the acquisition of new territory by the United States. The U.S. Constitution
expressly gives Congress the power to admit new states into the Union. That power
was clearly exercised in the annexation of Texas. The precedential value of the
annexation of Hawaii, on the other hand, is inconclusive because Hawaii was not
annexed as a state but as a territory.
50. See infra notes 52-56 and accompanying text.
51. Bums, supra note 10, at 16.
52. See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
53. See Treaty Between the United States and the French Republic, Apr. 30, 1803, art. 1, 8 Stat. 200,
201, T.S. No. 86 (Louisiana Purchase); Treaty of Amity, Settlement, and Limits, Between the United
States of America and His Catholic Majesty, Feb. 22, 1819, art. 2, 8 Stat. 252, 253 (cession of Florida
by Spain); Treaty with Great Britain, June 15, 1846, art. 1. 9 Stat. 869, T.S. No. 120 (Oregon
Compromise); Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Limits and Settlement Between the United States of America
and the Mexican Republic, Feb. 2, 1838, art. 5, 9 Stat. 922, 926-27, T.S. No. 207 (cession of California
by Mexico); Treaty with Mexico, Dec. 30, 1853, art. 1, 10 Stat. 1031, 1032, T.S. No. 208 (Gadsden
Purchase); Treaty with Russia, March 30, 1867, art. 1, 15 Stat. 539, T.S. No. 301 (cession of Alaska by
Russia); Treaty of Paris Between the United States and Spain, done Dec. 10, 1898, 30 Stat. 1754, T.S.
No. 343; Isthmian Canal Convention, Nov. 18, 1903, arts. 2 & 3, 33 Stat. 2234, 2234-35, T.S. No. 431
(cession of Panama Canal Zone by Panama); Convention Between the United States and Denmark for
Cession of the Danish West Indies, Aug. 4, 1916, art 1, 39 Stat. 1706, T.S. No. 629 (purchase of the
Virgin Islands from Denmark).
See also Cession of Tutuila and Aunuu, Chief of Tutuila to United States Government, April 17,
1900, reprinted in American Samoa Code Annotated 2 (1981), and Leibowitz, American Samoa: Decline
of a Culture, 10 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 220, 229-30 n. 76 (1980); the Manua Islands were ceded in a
separate document in July 1904, reprinted in American Samoa Code 9-11 (1973). Congress did not
formally accept this cession until 1929,43 Stat. 1253 (Feb. 20, 1929), now codified in 48 U.S.C. § 1431.
Swains Islands became a part of American Samoa by joint resolution of Congress, approved on March
4, 1925. H.R.J. Res. 244, 68th Cong., 2d Sess., 43 Stat. 1357 (1925); Guam was acquired by the United
States through a treaty of cession concluding the war with Spain. Treaty of Paris, U.S.-Spain, Dec. 10,
1898, art. II, 30 Stat. 1754, T.S. No. 343.
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Perfunctory dismissal by the Justice Department of the impact of the Guano
Islands Act,-5 through the bare statement that "[the Act] does not appear to be an
explicit claim of territory by Congress,""5 is not warranted. The Act clearly
provides a mechanism for legitimizing territorial claims entered by U.S. citizens on
behalf of the U.S. government. According to Justice Sutherland, "[n]o action or lack
of action on the part of the President could destroy [the] potentiality . . [of an
existing law]. Congress alone could do that."56
E. Conclusion
The U.S. expanded territorial sea is a direct result of evolutionary changes in
international law. 7 No closely analogous historical acquisition of territory exists.
Although failure of Congress to act in the near future likely will not create a
constitutional crisis, the dangers of individualized judicial assessment of each federal
statute referring to the territorial sea should be heeded.58 Congress need not
accommodate the Justice Department's suggestion that legislation be passed negating
the expansion of domestic coverage. Rather, a thoughtful analysis of domestic law
affected by the Proclamation should be undertaken, followed by passage of well-
coordinated amendments that reflect a comprehensive national oceans policy with
a minimum of intergovernmental resource conflicts. The next section presents a
survey of statutes impacted by the Territorial Sea Proclamation.
54. 48 U.S.C. § 1411 (1988).
55. Kmiec, supra note 2, at 21, n.65.
56. Archer & Bondareff, supra note 10, at 136, citing Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 322. See also
Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp, 488 U.S. 428,441 n.8 (1989), in which the Supreme
Court suggests that extension of the U.S. territorial sea to twelve miles may affect how domestic laws are
interpreted.
57. Archer & Bondareff, supra note 10, at 130.
58. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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III. A SURVEY OF STATUTES REFERRING TO
THE TERRITORIAL SEA
A. Introduction
This section examines provisions in federal statutes that refer to the territorial
sea and evaluates the ambiguities in their interpretation engendered by President
Reagan's Territorial Sea Proclamation.59 Some statutes specifically limit the extent
of their applicability to a three-mile territorial sea; others do not address the width
of the territorial sea at all. Our research found relatively few serious ambiguities.
The statutes discussed below are classified in three ways: serious ambiguities, minor
ambiguities, and no ambiguities.
B. Serious Ambiguities
1. Endangered Species Act'
The Endangered Species Act prohibits the taking, possessing, selling, delivering,
carrying, transporting and shipping of listed threatened and endangered species
"within the United States or the territorial sea of the United States.'6 ' Because
Congress did not define the territorial sea in the Act, its provisions may be
unenforceable in the three-to-twelve nautical mile zone.62 The ambiguity particular-
ly effects the protection of nonmammals such as turtles and seabirds (compare the
Marine Mammal Protection Act, discussed below).
59. Territorial Sea Proclamation, supra, note 1. A computer search of all references to territorial seas
or territorial waters in the United States Code was done to identify ambiguities. Included in the analysis
are statutes using "coastal waters" or similar terms when they appear to refer to the territorial sea.
60. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1988).
61. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1).
62. Although it is the policy of the National Marine Fisheries Service to enforce the Act in the 3-12
mile zone (and further to the limits of the United States' exclusive economic zone), that authority is not
expressly granted by the text of the Act. Telephone interview with Gene Witham, NMFS enforcement
agent in Honolulu, November 20, 1990.
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2. Ocean Dumping Act63
The Ocean Dumping Act regulates the intentional dumping of materials into the
ocean.64 Before dumping material transported from outside the United States into
the U.S. territorial sea or contiguous zone, one must obtain a permit from the
Environmental Protection Agency.' The EPA must deny a permit request if the
disposition of the material, except for dredged material, would unreasonably impair
navigation in the territorial sea of the United States.' The Territorial Sea
Proclamation creates three interesting problems. First, can the EPA cite adverse
impacts on navigation in the three-to-twelve nautical mile zone as a reason to deny
a permit? Second, under the Act, the contiguous zone is defined such that it is
defacto co-extensive with the twelve-mile territorial sea. Within this zone, a permit
from EPA is required if the dumping "may affect the territorial sea or the territory
of the United States."' Even if the words "territorial sea" in this phrase reflect the
three-mile limit, the "territory of the UnitedStates" could nonetheless include the
twelve-mile territorial sea as the Proclamation was clearly intended to expand the
seaward boundary, and thus the territory, of the United States. If so, permits are
now required for dumping that affects the three-to-twelve mile zone. Third, the
Proclamation is silent in regards to extension of the U.S. contiguous zone from
twelve to twenty-four miles. Should such an extension occur, Congress should
consider whether to amend the Ocean Dumping Act to reflect the extension.
3. Deepwater Ports ActO
The Deepwater Ports Act controls the ownership, construction and operation of
deepwater ports. For purposes of the Act, deepwater ports are defined as certain
63. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1445 (1988).
64. "'Ocean waters' means those waters of the open seas lying seaward of the baseline from which
the territorial sea is measured, as provided for in the Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous
Zone." 33 U.S.C. § 1402(b).
65. 33 U.S.C. § 1411(b).
66. 33 U.S.C. § 1416(c).
67. 33 U.S.C. § 1411(b).
68. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1524 (1988).
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structures located beyond the territorial sea.' It is unlikely that the Proclamation
divests Congress of authority over deepwater ports located within the three-to-twelve
nautical mile zone. However, to prevent challenges to the Secretary of Transporta-
tion's authority and to ensure that existing and future ports meet federal criteria for
licensing, Congress should amend the Act to clarify when a license is required.
4. Prevention of Pollution From Ships70
The International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships
(MARPOL), codified domestically as the Act to Prevent Pollution from Ships, is
designed to reduce intentional and negligent marine pollution incidents through
regulation of ships' operating procedures 7' Congress adopted separate jurisdiction-
al standards for applicability of Annex V and Annexes I and II. Regulations under
Annex V apply to ships of any MARPOL country while in the navigable waters or
EEZ of the United States;72 Annexes I and II apply only in U.S. navigable
waters.73 Because Congress failed to define "navigable waters," and because that
term has several meanings in U.S. law, Annexes I and II might not apply in the
three-to-twelve mile zone. Annex V clearly does, because it encompasses the EEZ.
Under Article 5 of MARPOL, both the flag state and a coastal state in which
a violation occurs may proceed against an offending vessel. Although some
ambiguity exists on the international level, a clear trend is emerging that favors
preventing the ocean from becoming an unrestricted reservoir for human waste
69. "'[D]eepwater port' means any fixed or floating man-made structures other than a vessel, or any
group of such structures, located beyond the territorial sea and off the coast of the United States." 33
U.S.C. § 1502(10).
70. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1911 (1988).
71. Convention for the Prevention of Pollution From Ships, done November 2, 1973, T.I.A.S. 10561,
12 I.LM. 1319 (1973); Protocol to the Convention with Annexes, done February 17, 1978, 17 LLM. 546
(1978).
72. 33 U.S.C. § 1902(a)(3) (1988).
73. 33 U.S.C. § 1902(a)(1).
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materials? 4 As a matter of sound ocean policy, the Act should be made applicable
to a ship from a MARPOL country that illegally dumps waste in the three-to-twelve
mile zone.
5. Death on the High Seas by Wrongful Act
5
The fundamental question of the domestic impact of the Territorial Sea
Proclamation is raised under the Death on the High Seas by Wrongful Act
legislation. Section 767 explicitly excludes "waters within the territorial limits of
any state" 6 from the Act's requirements. An argument might be made that the
reference to state limits manifests congressional intent to limit application of the act
to state jurisdiction as it existed when the act was passed (under the Submerged
Lands Act). On the other hand, if the Presidential Proclamation did not succeed in
limiting its effect to the international arena, then the territorial boundary of the states
may have been extended to twelve nautical miles.
6. National Transportation and Safety Board Act"
This Act authorizes an independent National Transportation and Safety Board
to investigate major marine casualties involving private vessels "on the navigable
waters or territorial seas of the United States."78 Absent further definition, the
geographic extent of the Board's jurisdiction beyond three miles is in doubt.
7. Vessels in United States Territorial Waters79
Under this Act, the President is granted emergency powers to regulate anchorage
and movement of vessels in the territorial waters of the United States during national
74. M. Casey Jarman, Disposal ofWaste and Right ofPassage 15 (paperpresented at the 24th Annual
Conference of the Law of the Sea Institute, Tokyo, Japan, July, 1990) (publication forthcoming).
75. 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 761-768 (1988)
76. 46 U.S.C. app. § 767.
77. 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 1901-1905 (1988).
78. Id., § 1903(a)(1)(E).
79. 50 U.S.C. §§ 191-198 (1988).
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emergencies." Because the Territorial Sea Pro-clamation's purpose was to claim
a broadened territorial sea for national defense purposes, and this Act is directed
towards protection of our national security, Congress likely intended this Act to
apply to the U.S. territorial sea, at whatever distance. However, the critical nature
of the powers granted necessitates Congressional action to clarify the ambiguity.
8. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act8e '
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act authorizes federal and state courts to
decide claims of foreign states to sovereign immunity. Immunity is waived for
actions based upon commercial activities carried on in the United States 2 or
involving property present in the United States.83 The United States is defined to
include "all territory and waters, continental or insular, subject to the jurisdiction of
the United States.'' Absent further guidance from Congress, it is unclear whether
waiver of immunity can be asserted for activities in the three-to-twelve nautical mile
zone.
9. Ocean Thermal Energy Conversion Act85
The Territorial Sea Proclamation raises an interesting problem under the Ocean
Thermal Energy Conversion Act (OTECA). OTECA provides for regulation of the
construction, location, ownership and operation of ocean thermal energy conversion
(OTEC) facilities.86 For facilities owned by American citizens, OTECA clearly
applies within the three-to-twelve mile zoneY For foreign-owned OTEC facilities,
80. Id., § 191.
81. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1988). See also 47 U.S.C. § 33 (1988).
82. Id., § 1605(a)(2).
83. Id., § 1605(a)(3).
84. Id,. § 1603(c).
85. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9101-9168 (1988 & Supp. 1989).
86. Id., § 9101 (1988).
87. Id., § 9111(a).
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however, OTECA jurisdiction extends to only those facilities "connected to the
United States by pipeline or cable or located in whole or in part between the high
water mark and the seaward boundary of the territorial sea of the United States."'8
Therefore, owners of foreign-owned OTEC facilities, unless the facility is a
vessel,89 may not be subject to OTECA in the three-to-twelve mile zone.
C. Other Ambiguities Needing Clarification
1. Travel Control of Citizens and Aliens During War or National Emergency-
Restrictions and Prohibitions on Aliens90
This law restricts the entering and departing of aliens from the United States
during times of war or other national emergency.9' The United States is defined
to include "all territory and waters, continental and insular, subject to the jurisdiction
of the United States."92 Although not much of practical significance may be at
stake here, both the Territorial Sea and Exclusive Economic Zone Proclamations93
would permit Congress to expand authority under this Act out to 200 miles.
Whether it does so automatically is unclear.
88. Id.. § 9101(a).
89. Arguably, an OTEC vessel could not operate in the 3-12 mile zone, because the innocent passage
regime is applicable to foreign vessels in the extended territorial sea. United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 62/122, reprinted in 21 I.LM.
1261 (1982), arts. 17-32. Carrying on OTEC activities falls outside the definition of innocent passage
and is therefore precluded. Id.
90. 8 U.S.C. § 1185 (1988).
91. Id., § 1185(a).
92. Id., § 1185(c).
93. Territorial Sea Proclamation, supra note 1; Presidential Proclamation No. 5030, 48 Fed. Reg.
10605 (1983).
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2. Tariff Act of 19309"
Ambiguity under this Act is raised in relation to civil penalties for aviation
smuggling. Certain penalties apply to enumerated acts "performed within 250 miles
of the territorial sea of the United States."'95 Without Congressional clarification,
application of this section will extend either 253 or 262 miles seaward of the coast,
depending on the definition of the territorial sea.
3. Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act9 6
The continental shelf in this law is defined in reference to the territorial sea:
'Continental Shelf' means -- (A) the seabed and subsoil of the submarine
areas adjacent to the coast, but outside of the area of the territorial sea...
to a depth of exploitability.
97
The statute contains no language similar to the Submerged Lands Act98 specifically
defining the territorial sea according to Congressional grant, thereby creating an
ambiguity. No serious problem exists, however, because it is clear that Congress
intended this act to apply to mining beyond the continental shelf.
4. International Navigational Rules Act 9
By statute, Congress has authorized the President to adopt the International
Regulations For Preventing Collisions at Sea."°° However, vessels "while in the
waters of the United States shoreward of the navigational demarcation lines dividing
94. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1677k (1988).
95. Id., § 1590(g).
96. 30 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1473 (1988).
97. Id., § 1403(2).
98. See discussion, infra notes 171-77 and accompanying text.
99. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1608 (1988).
100. Id., § 1602.
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the high seas from harbors, rivers, and other inland waters of the United States"'0 '
are not subject to international regulations. "High seas" is defined in the law to
mean "all parts of the sea that are not included in the territorial sea or in the internal
waters of any nation.""°2 Because the demarcation lines are already drawn,"°
the ambiguity is largely irrelevant.
5. Merchant Marine Act of 192001
Under the Merchant Marine Act, it is illegal to transport merchandise by water
or by land and water "between points in the United States, including Districts,
Territories, and possessions thereof embraced within the coastwise laws....""
Despite the absence of a specific reference to the territorial sea, the boundary issue
could arise in the context of the language quoted above if, for example, an artificial
island located six miles offshore were used as a transshipment point. The answer
depends upon whether the Proclamation is a constitutionally valid acquisition of
territory that conferred U.S. sovereignty over the three-to-twelve nautical mile zone.
6. Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act'
The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act establishes a system for leasing minerals
on the U.S. outer continental shelf. For purposes of the Act, federal jurisdiction over
resources on the continental shelf begins at the seaward boundary of the coastal
states as defined by the Submerged Lands Act."17 Among the purposes of the Act
are provisions for federal assistance to states to ameliorate adverse affects to their
coastal zones and for state participation in policy and planning decisions regarding
101. Id., § 1604(a).
102. Id., § 1601(2).
103. See 33 C.F.R. pt. 80 (1990).
104. 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 861-889 (1988 & Supp. 1989).
105. IM, § 883. See also id. §§ 801, 883-1, and 5101.
106. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1348 (1988).
107. Id., § 1331.
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development of outer continental shelf mineral resources." The term "coastal
zone" is defined as extending "seaward to the outer limit of the United States
territorial sea."' 9  Monies to assist the state are to come from §8(g) revenues."
Although not a major problem, a question exists as to whether states can apply for
8(g) monies to use in projects in the three-to-twelve mile zone.
D. No Apparent Ambiguity
1. Tariff Act of 19301"
Vessels receiving merchandise while in customs waters beyond the United States
territorial sea are subject to arrival, reporting and entry requirements under the Tariff
Act.'12 For foreign vessels subject to treaty or other negotiated arrangement,
customs waters are those defined in the treaty or agreement." 3  For all other
foreign vessels, customs waters extend to four leagues from the U.S. coast."4 Be-
cause four leagues are equivalent to twelve nautical miles, no practical problem
exists.
2. Atlantic Striped Bass Conservation Act"'
State authority under the Atlantic Striped Bass Conservation Act extends to "any
pocket of waters that is adjacent to the State and totally enclosed by lines delimiting
108. Id., § 1332(4)(A), (B).
109. Id., § 1331(e).
110. Id., §§ 1332(4), 133 7(g).
111. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1401 to 1677k (1988).
112. Id., § 1401(k).
113. Id., § 14016).
114. Id.
115. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1851 (Historical and Statutory Notes) (1988).
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the territorial sea of the United States. . .""6 Because no new pockets would be
created by the extension of the territorial sea from three-to-twelve miles, this statute
does not need amendment. The second use of territorial sea in the Act is not
impacted by the Proclamation because it is referenced to the baseline rather than the
seaward limit 17
3. Shore Protection Act of 1988118
This law prohibits the transport of municipal or commercial waste in coastal
waters without a permit." 9 Because "coastal waters" are defined to include both
the territorial sea and the EEZ,' the Proclamation does not affect jurisdiction
under this Act.
4. Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act
This Act provides coverage for personal injuries occurring on the navigable
waters of the United States. The term "United States" is defined to include the
territorial waters of the coastal states, the territories, and the District of Colum-
bia."2 Courts have construed the term "navigable waters" broadly to include both
state waters and high seas areas beyond twelve miles."2 Therefore, no practical
ambiguity has resulted.
116. Id., § 1856(2).
117. Id., § 1851 (Historical and Statutory Notes).
118. 33 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2623 (1988).
119. Id., § 2602(a).
120. Id., § 2601(2).
121. 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1988).
122. Id., § 902(a).
123. St. Julien v. Deamond M. Dulley, 403 F. Supp. 1256 (E.D. La. 1975); Reynolds v. Ingalls
Shipbuilding Division, litton System, Inc., 788 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1986).
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5. Oil Pollution Act of 1990' 24
The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 governs liability for removal costs and damages
associated with oil discharged from vessels or facilities into navigable waters, the
adjacent shoreline, or the EEZ. Because the territorial sea is defined in the Act to
extend seaward to a limit of three miles,'2 no ambiguity exists.
6. Atlantic Tunas Convention"2
For purposes of implementing the Atlantic Tunas Convention, Congress has
defined fisheries zones to include "the waters included within a zone contiguous to
the territorial sea of the United States, of which the inner boundary is a line
coterminous with the seaward boundary of each coastal State... [to] two hundred
nautical miles. . ."" Here the territorial sea is equated with the seaward
boundary of each coastal state, which is determined under the Submerged Lands Act
(SLA). SLA boundaries are not affected by the territorial sea proclamation, so no
ambiguity is created here.
7. Jellyfish or Sea Nettles, Other Such Pests, and Seaweed in Costal Waters:
Control or Elimination"
This Act authorizes the Secretary of Commerce to assist states in controlling and
eliminating jellyfish in coastal waters."2 Absence of a definition of coastal waters
makes it unclear whether the Secretary can assist state efforts in the three-to-twelve
nautical mile zone. The broad purpose of the Act, however, suggests that such
authority extends into the ocean as far as necessary.
124. 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2761 (1988).
125. Id., § 2701(35).
126. 16 U.S.C. §§ 971-971i (1988).
127. Id., § 971(4).
128. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1205 (1988).
129. Id., § 1201.
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8. Comprehensive Environmental Response, and Compensation Liability Act
(CERCLA)130
This Act establishes a complex system for financing the cleaning up of
hazardous waste sites. It applies both on land and in the navigable waters of the
United States, which are defined as including the territorial sea.13' The territorial
sea is defined in reference to the Submerged Lands Act," thereby negating any
potential ambiguity raised by the Proclamation.
9. General Navigation Rules 3
This law authorizes the Coast Guard to differentiate between inland waters and
the high seas for a variety of purposes. The boundary is to be located within twelve
nautical miles from the baseline from which the territorial sea is measured. 4 On
its face, this provision does not reflect any ambiguity as the Coast Guard's authority
is not tied to the seaward boundary of the territorial sea. However, because "high
seas," "territorial seas," and "inland waters" have specific meanings in the context
of international law, it would be helpful if Congress would attempt to follow more
closely the international definitions. For example, application of the term "high
seas" to what are clearly waters of the territorial sea should be abandoned.
10. Eastern Pacific Tuna Fishing 13
5
This law refers to the territorial sea only in the context of its association with
the baseline from which it is measured ... but the Agreement Area does not
130. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988).
131. Id., § 9601(15).
132. Id., § 9601(30).
133. 33 U.S.C. § 151 (1988).
134. Id., § 151(b).
135. 16 U.S.C. §§ 972-972(h) (1988).
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include the zones within twelve nautical miles of the baseline from which the
breadth of the territorial sea is measured ... ."" Therefore, no ambiguity exists.
11. Marine Mammal Protection Act"3
The Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) regulates the exploitation of
marine mammals in U.S. waters. Waters under the jurisdiction of the United States
for purposes of the MMPA include both the territorial sea and the EEZ.' This
broad definition renders the twelve-mile extension irrelevant to jurisdiction under the
Act.
12. North Atlantic Salmon Fishing Act'39
This Act refers to the territorial sea only to describe the baselines; 4 therefore
the Proclamation does not affect it.
13. International Narcotics Control Act'
This Act states that "[w]ith the agreement of a foreign country, [prohibition of
an officer or employee of the United States making an arrest as part of any foreign
police action] does not apply with respect to maritime law enforcement operations
in the territorial sea of that country."' 42 Although reflective of the United States'
willingness to recognize other nations' twelve-nautical-mile territorial seas, the
United States' territorial sea is not at issue here.
136. Id., § 972(2).
137. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361 - 1407 (1988).
138. Id., § 1362(14).
139. 16 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3608 (1988).
140. Id., § 3606(a). "It is unlawful for any person, or any vessel, subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States-- (1) to conduct directed fishing for salmon in waters seaward of twelve miles from the
baselines from which the breadths of the territorial seas are measured." Id.
141. 22 U.S.C. §§ 2291 (1988).
142. Id., § 2291(c)(4),
[Vol. 2:1
FNwG IN A JURISDIcrONAL VOID
14. Sea Grant Act'
The Sea Grant Act establishes a nationwide, university-based marine research
program. The marine environment includes the ocean, coastal and Great Lakes
resources, including those of the coastal zone (as defined in the Coastal Zone
Management Act), the Great Lakes, territorial sea, EEZ, OCS and high seas."M
The broad definition in this Act encompasses the twelve-nautical-mile zone.
15. Ports and Waterways Safety Act'45
Among other things, the Ports and Waterways Safety Act authorizes the
designation of traffic separation schemes for vessels operating in the U.S. territorial
sea and high seas approaches to ports.Y6 When reasonable and necessary, the
Secretary of Transportation can mandate the use of traffic separation schemes for
certain categories of vessels operating in the territorial sea of the United states and
on the high seas beyond the territorial sea. 4 No problem is presented here under
domestic law because the traffic separation schemes are to be created wherever
needed, without regard to the status of the waters.
16. Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA or Clean Water Act)"
The Clean Water Act regulates the discharges of pollutants into the navigable
waters of the United States, which include the territorial sea.' 49 The territorial sea
143. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1121-1131 (1988).
144. d, § 1122(6).
145. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1221-1236 (1988).
146. Id., § 1223(c)(1).
147. Id., § 1223(c)(5)(B).
148. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988).
149. Several sections apply to the territorial sea: § 1311(h) refers to the discharge of effluents from
publicly owned treatment works into the territorial sea; § 1343(a) requires a National Pollution Discharge
Elimination Permit for discharges into the territorial sea; § 1344 sets up permit system for disposal of
(continued...)
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is defined in the Act as extending seaward for three nautical miles."s Therefore,
the Proclamation does not affect federal or state agency authority under the Clean
Water Act.
17. National Ocean Pollution Planning Act
5
'
The Ocean Pollution Research and Development and Monitoring Planning Act
directs preparation of a plan for pollution research and monitoring of the marine
environment. By definition, the marine environment encompasses the territorial sea,
EEZ, OCS and high seas. 52  Because application of the Act is so broad, the
extension of the territorial sea to twelve nautical miles should have no impact.
18. Vessel Documentation Act'53
Congress has set out vessel documentation requirements that are prerequisites
for employing vessels in certain trades."M Certificates of documentation may be
endorsed with a registry endorsement that designates the trade the vessel is
authorized to engage in' 55  A fishery endorsement is needed to fish in the
territorial sea and fishery conservation zones adjacent to Guam, American Samoa,
and the Northern Mariana Islands.'- The breadth of the fishery conservation zone
makes the distinction between a three and twelve mile territorial sea irrelevant.
149. (...continued)
dredge and fill materials into navigable waters, including the territorial sea; and § 1362(7) includes the
territorial sea in the definition of navigable waters of the United States.
150. Id., § 1362(8).
151. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1709 (1988).
152. Id., § 1702(4).
153. 46 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12122 (1988).
154. Id., § 12103.
155. Id., § 12110.
156. Id., § 12108(c).
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19. Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act
No ambiguity is present in this statute since it refers only to the territorial seas
of foreign nations."
E. Conclusion
The above discussion points out the need for Congressional action to clarify
ambiguities in domestic laws that implicate the territorial sea. The diverse nature
of the problems created militates against a Congressional approach that would apply
one definition to all references in current law to the territorial sea. The preceding
review and the discussion that follows also demonstrate the need for Congressional
flexibility in dealing with federal-state relationships in the marine waters adjacent
to the United States.
IV. MANAGEMENT OF NONLIVING RESOURCES IN THE
EXTENDED TERRITORIAL SEA
A. Introduction
Historically, both the federal and state governments have made competing
claims to ownership (dominium) and regulatory authority (imperium) over resources
in offshore areas. Initially, lack of assertion of authority by the federal government
left management of offshore mineral resources in the hands of the adjacent states.
President Truman's 1945 claim of United States jurisdiction and control over the
resources of the subsoil and seabed of the continental shelf' set the stage for
federal encroachment. Even though a press release accompanying the 1945
Proclamation stated that the policy established United States jurisdiction "from an
international standpoint" and did not "touch upon the question of Federal versus
157. 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 1901-1904 (1988).
158. 46 U.S.C. app. § 1903(c)(1) states: a "vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States"
includes "(D) a vessel located in the customs waters of the United States, and (E) a vessel located in the
territorial waters of another nation, where the nation consents to the enforcement of United States law by
the United States."
159. Presidential Proclamation No. 2667, 10 Fed. Reg. 12303 (September 28, 1945).
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State control,"'6 the federal government soon asserted claims against states with
valuable offshore mineral resources, suggesting that the Proclamation served a dual
purpose: establishing an international claim and altering the balance of state/federal
relations."' Although the Submerged Lands Act (SLA) 16 2 specifically granted
title to the submerged lands adjacent to coastal states out to a certain distance 6
(and thus not to the extent of an expanding U.S. territorial sea), the history of
competing federal-state claims suggests the possibility of renewed state claims
beyond the three-nautical-mile limit.
B. Previous Federal-State Conflicts
In the landmark case of United States v. California,65 the U.S. Supreme Court
held that the federal government, through its foreign policy power as sovereign, has
paramount rights in the submerged lands. The Court was persuaded that no previous
case decided conflicting claims between a state and the federal government to the
160. White House Press Release, September 28, 1945, reprinted in 13 DEP'T ST. BULL. 484 (1945).
161. Nicol, Hawaii's Territorial Sea and Exclusive Economic Zone: Analysis and Assessment of the
State's Right to Manage Resources in Extended Ocean Zones 11 (unpublished student paper prepared for
Second Year Seminar, University of Hawaii Law School, April 1987).
162. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1315 (1988)
163. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301(a), 1311.
164. It is not clear whether the SLA grants to states ownership of the water column and water surface.
The language of U.S.C. § 1314(a) reserving federal rights refers to the navigable waters, but the language
granting state ownership, use, and management rights speaks only of "lands and natural resources."
Section 13 11(d) expressly preserves federal authority over navigation, flood control, and production of
power; the awareness of ocean thermal energy efforts at that time suggests that Congress considered water
column uses, but that inference is not convincing in light of the Act's focus on development of the energy
resources of the seabed.
Resolution of this uncertainty would have a direct impact upon the interpretation of statutory
ambiguities, discussed supra in Section III.
165. 332 U.S. 19 (1947) [hereinafter California I].
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three-mile belt in a way that required extension of the Pollard's Lessee v.
Hagan'66 inland-water rule to the ocean area.' 67 The Supreme Court also reject-
ed the State of California's historical claim to the three-mile marginal sea because
the concept of the territorial sea was not settled in the international community at
that time. The original U.S. territorial sea claim was made by Secretary of State
Thomas Jefferson after the formation of the union; therefore, none of the original
thirteen states ever owned the submerged lands of the marginal sea (and consequent-
ly neither did California).
In United States v. Texas," the U.S. Supreme Court maintained that the
"national external sovereignty" rationale of California was compelling, despite strong
historical claims of doinnium resulting from Texas's prior status as an independent
nation. It held that where property interests are so subordinated to the rights of
sovereignty, as here, they will follow sovereignty. Furthermore, consistency with
California, United States v. Louisiana,'69 and the equal footing doctrine required
the national government to prevail.
70
C. Initial Congressional Response Failed to Resolve Conflict
In 1953, the SLA overturned the California I, Louisiana, and Texas decisions,
giving coastal states exclusive rights to the resources of the seabed within three
miles of their coasts.' In addition, states bordering the Gulf of Mexico were
166. 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845) (holding that the states owned the inland navigable tidewaters in
trust for their people, and that because Alabama was admitted to the union on an equal footing with the
other states it thereby became owner of the tidelands within its boundaries).
167. California 1, 332 U.S. at 31.
168. 339 U.S. 707 (1950).
169. 339 U.S. 699 (1950).
170. Texas, 339 U.S. at 719.
171. It is hereby determined and declared to be in the public interest that (1) title to and
ownership of thelands beneath navigable waters within the boundaries of the respective States,
and the natural resources within such lands and waters, and (2) the right and power to
manage, administer, lease, develop and use the said lands and natural resources all in
(continued...)
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provided the opportunity to extend boundaries to three marine leagues (nine nautical
miles) if they could prove that such a boundary was either previously approved by
Congress or existed prior to admission to the union. 72 The federal government's
resistance to Gulf State claims of submerged lands beyond three miles from shore
prompted suits by Louisiana, Texas, Mississippi, Alabama,'73 and Florida."
171. (...continued)
accordance with applicable State law be, and they are hereby, subject to the provisions hereof,
recognized, confirmed, established, and vested in and assigned to the respective States.
43 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (1988).
(1) The United States hereby releases and relinquishes unto said States and persons aforesaid,
except as otherwise reserved herein, all right, title, and interest of the United States, if any it
has, in and to all said lands, improvements, and natural resources.
Id., § 1311(b).
Nothing in this subchapter or subchapter I of this chapter shall affect the use, development,
improvement, or control by or under the constitutional authority of the United States of said
lands and waters for the purposes of navigation or flood control or the production of power,
or be construed as the release or relinquishment of any rights of the United States arising
under the constitutional authority of Congress to regulate or improve navigation, or to provide
for flood control, or the production of power.
Id., § 1311(d).
172. The seaward boundary of each original coastal State is hereby approved and confirmed
as a line three geographical miles distant from its coast line or, in the case of the Great Lakes,
to the international boundary. Any State admitted subsequent to the formation of the Union
which has not already done so may extend its seaward boundaries to a line three geographical
miles distant from its coast line, or to the international boundaries of the United States in the
Great Lakes or any other body of water traversed by such boundaries. Any claim heretofore
or hereafter asserted either by constitutional provision, statute, or otherwise, indicating the
intent of a State so to extend its boundaries is hereby approved and confirmed, without
prejudice to its claim, if any it has, that its boundaries extend beyond that line. Nothing in
this section is to be construed as questioning or in any manner prejudicing the existence of any
State's seaward boundary beyond three geographical miles if it was so provided by its
constitution or laws prior to or at the time such State became a member of the Union, or if it
has been heretofore approved by Congress.
43 U.S.C. § 1312 (1988).
173. United States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1 (1960).
174. United States v. Florida, 363 U.S. 121 (1960).
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Only Texas and Florida succeeded in persuading the court to recognize three-marine-
league boundaries.
The ambiguity of the SLA with respect to inland boundaries has also sparked
litigation. The SLA grant contains the following limiting language: "in no event
... [t]o be interpreted as extending from the coast line more than three geographical
miles.... . The "coast line" was defined as "the line of ordinary low water
along that portion of the coast which is in direct contact with the open sea and the
line marking the seaward limit of inland waters." 1 6 The term "inland waters,"
however, was not defined in the Act. In United States v. California'7 7 (California
I), the Court defined inland waters by reference to standards found in the 1958
Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone. This Convention
allows either a) straight baselines or b) baselines determined by the arcs and circles
method. Accepting the federal government's position that application of straight
baselines, a method the United States was opposing internationally, would hurt its
international posture, the Court applied the arcs and circles test. The California If
decision has been criticized for abandoning the consideration of historical evidence
that had guided the Court in California I and for maintaining the "fiction" of national
external sovereignty." In the opinion of Professor Milner S. Ball, the protection
of national interests would be best achieved by state ownership with a concurrent
federal government interest in those rights as outlined in the Constitution - power
over commerce, navigation, national defense, and international affairs.1 79
175. 43 U.S.C. § 1301(b) (1988) (emphasis added).
176. 43 U.S.C. § 1301(c) (1988).
177. 381 U.S. 139 (1965).
178. Milner S. Ball, Good Old American Permits, 12 ENViL. L. 623 (1982).
179. kLt at 635. Consider also:
The United States retains all its navigational servitude and rights in and powers of regulation
and control of said lands and navigable waters for the constitutional purposes of commerce,
navigation, national defense, and international affairs, all of which shall be paramount to, but
shall not be deemed to include, proprietary rights of ownership, or the rights of management,
administration, leasing, use, and development of the lands and natural resources which are
specifically recognized, confirmed, established, and vested in and assigned to the respective
States and others by § 1311 of this tide.
43 U.S.C. § 1314(a) (1988).
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President Reagan's Territorial Sea Proclamation appears to have eliminated the
security interests behind the federal government's claim to control the offshore
waters beyond three miles, thus undercutting the rationale of earlier Court decisions.
Coastal state control of areas in the three-to-twelve nautical-mile zone would not
now present any significant problems for national security. A strong argument can
be made, therefore, that the states should now have substantial powers over the
three-to-twelve mile area.
D. Secondary Response Also Ineffective
State opposition to federal offshore development activities prompted 1978
amendments to the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA), which make
numerous references to federal-state cooperation." Read with their accompanying
180. [S]uch States, and through such States, affected local governments, are entitled to
an opportunity to participate, to the extent consistent with the national interest, in
the policy and planning decisions made by the Federal Government relating to
exploration for, and development and production of, minerals of the outer
Continental Shelf.
43 U.S.C. § 1332(4)(C) (1988) (emphasis added).
[T]he rights and responsibilities of all States and, where appropriate, local governments, to
preserve and protect their marine, human, and coastal environments through such means as
regulation of land, air, and water uses, of safety, and of related development and activity
should be considered and recognized.
Id., § 1332(5) (emphasis added).
During the preparation of any proposed leasing program under this section, the Secretary shall
invite and consider suggestions for such program from any interested Federal agency,
including the Attorney General, in consultation with the Federal Trade Commission, and from
the Governor of any State which may become an affected State under such proposed program.
The Secretary may also invite or consider any suggestions from the executive of any affected
local government in such an affected State, which have been previously submitted to the
Governor of such State, and from any other person.
Id., § 1344(c)(1) (emphasis added).
Any Governor of any affected State or the executive of any affected local government in such
State may submit recommendations to the Secretary regarding the size, timing, or location of
a proposed lease sale or with respect to a proposed development and production plan.
Id., § 1345(a).
(continued...)
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rules, the OCSLA amendments obviously were intended to give the states an
opportunity to participate more extensively in federal offshore decisions. For
example, section 8(g)18' requires the Department of Interior to consult with the
governor of a state adjacent to a proposed lease of submerged lands where a
possibility of common pools or fields exists (recognizing the problem of drainage
of hydrocarbons from beneath state lands through wells located in the federal outer
continental shelf). Disagreeing with the Interior Department's position that it is not
required to act on the governor's recommendations, the states of Louisiana and
Texas each brought suits to enjoin certain offshore lease sales by the Interior
Department.Y This action represented a drastic step for Louisiana, a producing
state whose economy is directly linked to oil and gas revenues. The federal
government won the suit and proceeded with the sale of the contested lease, but all
monies received from 8(g) common pools (as part of the lease) were placed in
escrow by court order. Congress responded to the drawn-out litigation with 1986
amendments to the OCSLAts3 providing for lump sum payment of $1.4 billion
from the Section 8(g) fund to the coastal states.
180. (...continued)
The Secretary is authorized to enter into cooperative agreements with affected States for
purposes which are consistent with this chapter and other applicable Federal law. - Such
agreements may include, but need not be limited to, the sharing of information (in accordance
with the provisions of section 1352 of this title), the joint utilization of available expertise, the
facilitating of permitting procedures, joint planning and review, and the formation of joint
surveillance and monitoring arrangements to cany out applicable Federal and State laws,
regulations, and stipulations relevant to outer Continental Shelf operations both onshore and
offshore.
Id., § 1345(e) (emphasis added).
The Secretary shall, by regulation, establish procedures for carrying out his duties under this
section, and shall plan and carry out such duties in cooperation with affected States.
Id., § 1346(c) (emphasis added).
181. 43 U.S.C. § 1337(g)(1)(B) and (D) (1988).
182. Mary Ellen Leeper, Offshore Oil and Gas, in PRocEEDINGS: NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE
STATES AND AN EXTENDED TErRIAL SEA 58,62 (Lauriston R. King and Amy Broussard, eds. 1987)
[hereinafter PROCEEDINGS].
183. Pub. L No. 99-272, 100 Stat. 148, 150 (1986) (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 1337(g)).
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Uncertainties regarding Congressional intent and statutory interpretation have
had a detrimental effect upon the already tense federal-state relations in other states
as well."M The history of federal-state conflicts illustrates the willingness of the
states to fight for their rights in the marginal sea. It is likely, therefore, that the
territorial sea extension will lead to renewed litigation of both regulatory (particular-
ly with respect to federal-state cooperation) and proprietary issues. Potential impacts
upon other legislation8 5 present even further prospects for litigation. These
inconsistencies could be addressed through the process of statutory construction, but
a much better solution would be for Congress to resolve the uncertainties through
establishing a comprehensive and comprehensible national ocean policy.
E. Equities Favoring Coastal State Control
The Territorial Sea Proclamation has arguably tilted the balance of offshore
resource interests toward the states. If accepted, this view provides a rational basis
for extending state ocean boundaries. At the very least, the Proclamation provides
an opportunity to reevaluate the balance of power in offshore resource management.
Notions of equity favor such reconsideration. For example, coastal states not only
must supply sites and facilities for construction, transportation, processing, and
storage but also must bear the environmental burden of these support industries. In
addition, the coastal state must provide a governmental and social infrastructure for
the offshore workers, a costly undertaking.
Congress should also consider the practical effectiveness of the OCSLA's
Section 8(g) and consultation provisions. Evidence suggests that these provisions
have not sufficiently protected state interests. Throughout years of contention with
the federal government, state frustration has been compounded by the Interior
Department's apparent refusal to address state concerns adequately. Despite
diligently following the cooperative provisions of the OCSLA, states sometimes have
received a mere paragraph in response from the Interior Department stating that their
185. See supra, Section III "Statutory Ambiguities."
184. See, e.g., Crystal R. Brand, Casenote, The Seaweed Rebellion: Federal-State Conflicts over
Offshore Oil and Gas Development, 18 WILLAMEr L REv. 535 (1982); Gregory R. Razo, Comment,
The Seaweed Rebellion Revisited: Continuing Federal-State Conflicts in OCS Oil and Gas Leasing, 20
WILLAMETrE L. REv. 83 (1984); Secretary of Interior v. California, 464 U.S. 312 (1984).
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concerns were noted but rejected. 86
The Department of the Interior's lack of responsiveness created such political
pressure from the State of California that Congress has established a moratorium on
federal leases off the California coasL" In addition to affecting oil and gas
development, the shutdown has retarded ocean mining efforts, with a likely
continuing negative impact on future mining efforts in the area. The mechanisms
in place are ineffective. Without a meaningful right to consultation for states,s
the federal government has little incentive to act in a manner that takes into account
state interests and concerns.
Political and economical advantages are to be gained by making concessions to
the coastal states. For example, the Interior Department and the State of Hawaii
have entered into a Joint Planning Agreement over offshore hard mineral mining in
186. Leeper, supra note 182, at 65. In one case, a state provided input at each stage of the process,
filing over 500 pages of comments to the Interior Department's draft environmental impact statement.
The comments did not cause a single change to Interior's planning.
187. See e.g., §§ 110-113 of Pub. L 100-446, 102 Stat. 1774, 1801 (1988) (moratorium on offshore
federal oil and gas leasing included in appropriation measure).
188. But see Kern Lowry, M. Casey Jarman & Susan Maehara, FederaliState Cooperation in Coastal
Management: An Assessment of Federal Consistency Provisions of the Coastal Zone Management Act
(publication forthcoming in OCEAN & SHORELINE MGMT.) and discussion infra notes 244-246 and
accompanying text. This study could be interpreted to show that consultancy has been effective in some
circumstances. In 1983, only 432 (or six percent) of the federal consistency reviews were objected to by
the states; six percent of the consistency reviews in states responding to a 1988 survey were objected to.
Id. at 6.
The 1983 and 1988 surveys indicate that state and federal agency officials do resolve many disputes
through informal negotiation. Disposition of formal appeals between 1983 and 1991 show that the
Secretary of Commerce is reluctant to override state decisions. Of 75 filed appeals, six state objections
were overridden and eight upheld; one has been stayed pending further negotiations; twenty-six were
withdrawn by mutual consent; sixteen are currently pending approval; and eighteen have been dismissed
for good cause. Id. at 14. This apparent even-handedness, however, may be misleading. In five of the
six cases in which a state agency has sought mediation, the federal agency has refused to participate (the
sixth case led to litigation, Secretary of the Interior v. Califomia). Id. at 13. The Secretary's written
opinions on formal appeals have construed "competing national interest" broadly against the states, finding
that the national interest benefits of OCS energy development outweigh potential adverse environmental
impacts. Id. at n.2, 14, citing TI m Eichenberg & Jack Archer, The Federal Consistency Doctrine: Coastal
Zone Management and 'New Federalism', 14 ECOL. L.Q. 9, 41-46 (1987).
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the EEZ surrounding Hawaii."s Interior's willingness to give Hawaii a substantial
role in the preparation of the environmental impact statement and subsequent
decision-making has paved the way for future mining efforts. This experience
provides a stark contrast to California's experience with offshore oil and gas leasing.
Interior's reticence to cooperate fully under the Coastal Zone Management Act
created additional political and economic costs, further exacerbating federal-state
tension in the offshore area. Interior's refusal to provide consistency certification
for oil and gas leases offshore California led to protracted litigation that ultimately
reached the U.S. Supreme Court." In Secretary of the Interior v. California,'9'
the Court agreed with Interior. Although the case vindicated the Interior's legal
position, it did nothing to alleviate the political problems. Moratoria continue in
waters off California and at the end of its 1990 session, Congress overturned the
Supreme Court by extending the CZMA's consistency provision to activities within
and outside the coastal zone, including oil and gas leases.
The SLA, OCSLA, and CZMA all recognize the significance of state interests
in offshore mineral resource decision-making. Interior's continual ignoring of these
interests, coupled with diminished federal security interests in the zone, suggest the
need for re-ordering of decision-making in the extended territorial sea.
F. Prospects for Cooperation -- Revenue Sharing
Should the federal government be unwilling to relinquish its control over
nonliving resources in the three-to-twelve mile zone, several other options can be
pursued. One remedy is for Congress to implement some form of revenue sharing
between the state and federal governments.'92 Coastal states would be more
supportive of offshore development if they had the financial wherewithal effectively
to research, plan, manage, and propose mitigation measures concerning OCS leasing
189. Cooperative Agreement Between the Department of the Interior and the State of Hawaii for
Marine Mineral Joint Planning and Review (1988).
190. Secretary of the Interior v. California, 464 U.S. 312 (1984).
191. Id.
192. Attempts by Congress to date have been unsuccessful. See e.g. S.B. 341 (Title VIII, Impact
Assistance) introduced by Senator Johnston; S.B. 49 (Coastal Resources Enhancement) introduced by
Senator Stevens; H.R. 94 (Revenue Sharing) introduced by Representative Fields.
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impacts, and particularly if they had a positive financial stake in OCS development.
The costs of revenue-sharing would be offset by the increased federal receipts that
would flow from a more orderly leasing process. More than simply correcting long-
standing inequities, revenue sharing represents a small, but critical investment that
will ensure timely production and a sound marine/coastal resource management
scheme.
In support of their claim 93 for a 50% share of section 8(g) common pool
revenues, coastal states analogized their situation to that of states that receive 50%
of all revenues derived from mineral leasing of federal lands within their borders.
Coastal states, therefore, should receive comparable payment for the inclusive federal
leasing of the states' (common oil field) submerged lands."9
To counter foreseeable opposition by land-locked inland states, Richard Littleton
has proposed a modified revenue sharing plan. 95 He believes that unified support
for coastal state expansion, via sharing with all 50 states, would increase the chances
for a veto override in the Senate, if necessary. The states could be convinced by the
argument that coastal resource money going directly into state treasuries would be
more secure than federal appropriations. The federal interests in Congress could be
appeased by stressing that the proposal changes none of the established rights and
duties of the states and the federal government vis-a-vis each other; rather, the
proposal is merely a reallocation of revenues. And it creates an added benefit:
increased ocean awareness. A nation-wide move to institute stronger resource and
energy conservation measures would develop naturally out of the realization by
inland states that wasteful or careless production procedures reduce the amount of
revenues flowing to their individual states.
193. Leeper, supra note 182, at 63. Texas was ultimately successful in obtaining a 50% share where
the state was the original lessor, reserves were proven, and the federal lease brought a significantly higher
bid as a result of the information obtained from state leasing. The court did not, however, take into
account Louisiana's argument regarding the possibility of a state's lands being devalued as a result of
unsuccessful adjacent federal exploration.
194. Id., pursuant to the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920.
195. Richard Littleton, Coastal States, Inland States and a 12-Mile Territorial Sea, 17 J. MAR. L. &
CoMM. 539 (1986).
1992]
TroAL SEA JouRNAL
G. Prospects for Cooperation -- Joint Partnerships
The Joint Planning Agreement between Hawaii and the Department of the
Interior mentioned earlier demonstrates that a mutually acceptable agreement that
accounts for respective interests of states and the federal government can be reached.
Although this example may not work in other areas,' 96 it is a model for successful
federal-state interaction. The state and federal governments had identical interests
in this situation; where environmental concerns produce conflict between the two
divisions of government, similar cooperative efforts will be less likely to succeed.
H. Conclusion
Ownership of submerged lands out to three nautical miles was granted by the
SLA to all coastal states, with the exception of Texas and Florida who have three
leagues in the Gulf of Mexico. The federal government argues that the December
1988 Proclamation extending the territorial sea has no legal impact on the
proprietary status of submerged lands beyond those boundaries. However,
uncertainty regarding the status of this new U.S. territory presents a compelling
opportunity for a comprehensive re-examination of federal ocean policy and for
reconsideration of the states' role in territorial sea management. These important
policy matters should not continue to be accomplished in piecemeal fashion or by
default, but in an integrated manner. As Congress has already recognized in the
CZMA, "the increasing and competing demands upon the lands and waters of our
coastal zone.. . have resulted in ... permanent and adverse changes to ecological
systems."1'9  Mere consultative rights, which are often ignored anyway, do not
prevent the coastal states from being subjected to the whims of the federal
government. Although no single geographic definition will satisfy the needs of all
coastal states, a new functional approach to resource management is needed.
197. 16 U.S.C. § 1452(1) (1988).
196. See supra note 189. The isolation of the Hawaiian islands eliminates conflicts that otherwise
exist between adjacent states. The distance from the continental U.S. also presents a problem of
overextension for federal management agencies, thereby providing an incentive to seek cooperation from
the state.
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V. MANAGEMENT OF LIVING RESOURCES IN THE
EXTENDED TERRITORIAL SEA
A. Introduction
Proper management of living resources in United States waters is clearly a
matter of crucial importance. Nearly 90% by weight and 70% by value of our
fishery resources are caught within twelve miles of the coast.'98 Technological
advances over the years have improved the efficiency of the fishing industry, but
have also decimated our finite and nonexpanding fishery resources. Contrary to the
guiding principles of prior fisheries management efforts, the collapse of some of our
managed fisheries have taught us that we have no "under-utilized" species."'
Consequently, existing management theories must be restructured to incorporate
higher conservation standards and encourage the development of enhancement
programs. Any proposed alternative approach to living resource management must
acknowledge present confusion regarding regulatory authority in the three-to-twelve
nautical mile zone.
B. Sources of Conflict, Past and Potential
Under existing statutory arrangements, states have jurisdiction over the resources
in the first three miles offshore, ° but a state can effectively exercise jurisdiction
beyond this area with federal acquiescence.2 Conversely, the federal government
can preempt state authority in the territorial sea in exceptional cases involving
fisheries found predominantly outside the territorial sea. This action has been taken
198. Timothy R.E. Keeney, Impact of Extended Territorial Sea on NOAA's Marine Resource
Responsibilities, in PROCEEDINGS supra note 182, at 73, 75.
199. Donald F. Squires, Existing and Potential Resources in Offshore Waters of the United States, in
PROCEEDINGS, supra note 182, at 22, 27.
200. See, e.g., Fishery Conservation and Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1861 (1988); Submerged
Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1315 (1988).
201. See, e.g., State v. Bundrandt, 546 P.2d 530 (Alaska, 1976); Skiriotes v. Florida, 212 U.S. 69
(1941) discussed infra at notes 211-14 and accompanying text. See also Jeffery Baliweber & Richard
Hildreth, Summary of Fishery Management Implications of the Territorial Sea Extension (Draft for
Comment, May 31, 1989).
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only twice since 1976,"~ indicating that relations between the states and the
federal government under the Magnuson Act have been generally successful.,W
C. Problems Arising From Exclusive State Control
Any proposed management alternative must be carefully considered, as
resolution of federal-state conflicts by granting coastal states control of the twelve-
nautical-mile territorial sea could create its own problems. The MFCMA Regional
Councils are concerned that their authority will be limited if states are granted
jurisdiction over the three-to-twelve-mile zone. Similarly, commercial fishers are
afraid that states will use the extended coastal zone to exclude nonresident
commercial fishers from state waters. Federal officials have warned that the grant
of full fishery management authority to the states would prompt a return to interstate
"beggar-thy-neighbor" squabbles.' Cooperative interstate management efforts
prior to the MFCMA failed largely because each state sought to protect its own
fishing industry at the expense of its neighbors. The clear danger is that narrow-
minded and uncoordinated management efforts could have a devastating impact on
the operation of sound conservation programs.
D. Problems Arising From Preemptive Federal Control
The problems foreseen in the previous paragraph are not necessarily determina-
tive. Leniency of the federal government has been a cause of major problems in the
management of living resources.2 5 The Baldrige cases2" showed that as long
202. See Milner S. Ball, The States and the Territorial Sea, in PROCEEDINGS, supra note 182, at 11,
citing the following two cases for the proposition that the line drawn on water at three miles is not an
effective division between state and federal interests:
Douglas v. Seacoast Products, Inc., 431 U.S. 265 (1977) (a federal statute was found to
prevent Virginia from enforcing certain of its fishing laws); and
California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725 (1979) (holding that where there is a need for national
uniformity, federal interests prevail; where there is a need for diversity and local approaches,
then state interests should dominate).
203. Keeney, supra note 198, at 75.
204. Id.
205. Charles R. McCoy, Observations on a Twelve-Mile State Fisheries Jurisdiction, in PROCEEDINGS,
supra note 182 at 46, 48.
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as federal regulations allow the use of gear prohibited by state law, the state will be
unable to enforce its own prohibition unless actual use of prohibited gear in state
waters is observed. In Baldrige, a suit was brought by the State of Florida against
the U.S. Department of Commerce seeking to prevent implementation of parts of the
federal management plans addressing mackerel and grouper fisheries in the Gulf and
Atlantic. Florida's claim was based on the fact that the federal plans were in direct
conflict with Florida law (which prohibits the use of purse seines and fishtraps to
take fish); therefore, the Department of Commerce was in direct violation of the
consistency provisions of the CZMA. The obstruction of preventive measures
resulted in the collapse of the particular fishery involved in the Baldrige cases,
dramatically illustrating the practical effect of divergent management approach-
es. t" Clarification of the federal consistency requirement through the 1990 CZMA
reauthorization should reduce the likelihood of Baldrige-type conflicts.2 '
Amendments to federal statutes could remove some of the difficulties inherent in
preemption by declaring that the federal law out to twelve miles is the same as the
law that would apply within the adjacent state's territorial waters. An even better
option would be to apply minimum federal standards to state and federal waters and
allow the more restrictive state regulations to apply in federal waters as well. This
approach would enable coastal states to manage their migratory resources more
206. Id. at 47, originally filed as Florida v. Department of Commerce (cite not provided).
207. 16 U.S.C. § 1456 (1988). See Robert A. Taylor and Alison Rieser, Federal Fisheries and State
Coastal Zone Management Consistency: Florida Tests the Waters, III TERR. SEA (May, 1983).
208. McCoy, supra note 205, at 47.
209. See supra note 8.
210. Another example of conflict between federal and state management of living resources involves
the Tortugas Shrimp Bed off the coast of Florida. See Bateman v. Gardner, 716 F.Supp. 595 (S.D. Fla.
1989), aff d, 922 F.2d 847 (1lth Cir. 1990). More permissive federal regulations allowing certain kinds
of fishing gear that state regulations prohibit have hampered state law enforcement. State officers can
only enforce state law when it can be shown that the offensive fishing gear was used in state waters
because the less restrictive federal regulations justify mere possession (the fishers need only say that they
are headed for federal or unregulated waters). Extension of Florida's jurisdiction to 12 miles would
resolve some of the existing confusion by narrowing (but not eliminating) the band of unregulated waters
sandwiched between Florida territorial waters and the northwestern comer of the federal marine sanctuary
boundary. A 12-mile limit would certainly be more uniform than the three- and nine-mile limits currently
in place.
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effectively; consistency would at least require federal prohibition of fishing gear
prohibited by state law, effectively eliminating the problems encountered in Baldrige.
E. The Legal Regime of High Seas Living Resource Management
The conflicts discussed above do not reflect the norm for management of living
ocean resources. For the most part, absence of federal regulatory efforts permits
states to exercise jurisdiction beyond three miles from shore. This authority was
established in Skiriotes v. Florida,2 n a case where the state prosecuted some of its
citizens for violating Florida's prohibition on shrimping, despite the fact that the act
was committed outside state waters. The United States Supreme Court found "no
reason why the State of Florida may not likewise govern the conduct of its citizens
upon the high seas with respect to matters which the State has a legitimate interest
and where there is no conflict with acts of Congress.'2 2  Later, the Alaska
Supreme Court, in State v. Bundrant,2 3 interpreted the Outer Continental Shelf
Lands Act (OCSLA) to create an intended distinction between the inorganic
resources of the subsoil and seabed (principally oil), which were within the exclusive
domain of the federal government, and the living marine resources, which were not
affected by the act.2 4 The court thus permitted the State of Alaska to regulate the
taking of Alaskan King Crab beyond its territorial waters.
The federal government typically acquiesces where a state has a legitimate stake
in the specific resource involved and shows through the investment of money and
talent that it is willing to manage the resource with some sophistication and care.
For example, the Alaskan government in particular has made significant expenditures
to regulate fishery resources.1 5 As a result of these efforts, the interests of both
the federal and state governments have been advanced through the state's salmon
management and enhancement program. At the same time, the two governments
211. 212 U.S. 69 (1941).
212. Id. at 77.
213. 546 P.2d 530 (Alaska, 1976).
214. Id. at 546.
215. See infra, Section VI, notes 236-237 and accompanying text. Jill Bubier, Alaska King Crab:
State Assumes Larger Role in Federal Management, V TERR. SEA 1 (April, 1985).
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have avoided rivalries regarding jurisdictional limits. Alaska also has had success
regulating crabbing far beyond the three mile limit and into the high seas.
F. Advantages of Increased State Control
The state is the most logical administrator of these resources as the entity most
directly affected by management efforts and closest to the resource. The federal
government, however, maintains a significant role in negotiating treaties with foreign
nations and by exercising primary responsibility for administration of the MFCMA.
The impact on foreign relations must be considered in evaluating any proposal for
altering fishing rights in the exclusive economic zone (EEZ). Although little foreign
fishing occurs within three to twelve miles from shore, some important factors need
to be weighed. Amendment of the MFCMA to prohibit foreign fishing throughout
the extended territorial sea will destroy the potential for foreign-processing/domestic-
harvesting joint ventures in the three-to-twelve-mile zone. Additionally, the
symbolic effect of further reducing the area within the U.S. EEZ in which foreign
nationals may harvest surplus stock must also be considered.
216
In the final analysis, however, the more compelling state interests predominate.
The direct impact of management efforts on state lands, waters, and inhabitants, and
the proximity to the area make the state the most logical administrator. The state
has much greater interests at stake and is, therefore, more likely to enforce
appropriate regulations.
Modification of other living resource management regulations would be less
controversial. An extension of state authority from three to twelve miles would be
an effective way to promote the purposes of the Endangered Species Act,2 7
because state regulations are often more protective than their federal counterparts.
Similarly, an extension of state jurisdiction could enhance the protection provided
by the Marine Mammal Protection Act,1. particularly if a renewed interest in the
return of marine mammal management authority is pursued by states like Alaska,
Oregon and California.
216. Ballweber & Hildreth, supra note 201.
217. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1988). See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
218. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1407 (1988). See supra Section Im(D).
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The remaining living resource, highly migratory species, may also present a
problem now that the federal government has changed its position; Congress recently
amended the MFCMA to bring highly migratory species under its regulatory
authority, effective January 1, 1992.9
Increased state control should be seriously considered, especially in light of the
Department of Commerce's past determination that the issuance of uniform federal
fishing regulations applicable beyond state territorial waters would not be appropri-
ate.22" The substantial differences in both the kinds of fish caught and the
different fishing methods employed throughout the states221 undoubtedly present
a significant challenge to federal regulatory efforts. Those states with the ability to
manage living resources effectively should, therefore, be given the opportunity to
adopt regulatory measures appropriate for their special circumstances.
G. Conclusion
Federal-state conflicts can be successfully addressed by applying minimum
federal standards to state and federal waters while allowing more restrictive state
regulations to extend into federal waters. In those states where the capacity, interest,
and commitment necessary for efficient management of living resources is apparent,
there is no need to divide the territorial sea into two zones (one-to-three and three-
to-twelve nautical miles offshore). These states will be able to implement
management policies, carefully tailored to their own special needs and circumstances,
through laws that are necessarily more stringent than the federal minimums. The
arbitrariness of the three-mile limit, on the other hand, would be appropriate where
a coastal state lacked the resources needed for designing and implementing rational
management of the area. Minimum federal standards would protect fragile resources
in the entire twelve-mile zone without unduly infringing upon state sovereignty.
Granting states authority in the entire territorial sea, to twelve miles, would eliminate
many of the conservation problems that have occurred in the past. At the same time,
minimum federal standards would provide protection in those areas where the
219. Pub. L No. 101-627, 104 Stat. 4436 (1990) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(1)).
220. See State v. Bundrant, 546 P.2d 530 (Alaska, 1976), citing to a 1974 report by the Department
of Commerce.
221. Jon M. Van Dyke et al., The Legal Regime Governing Alaskan Salmon 40 (A Report to the
University of Alaska Sea Grant Program, June 1988).
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adjacent state is unable or unwilling to act, as well as insuring against exploitation
of resources by greedy state fishing industries.
VI. CONGRESSIONAL ALTERNATIVES FOR ADDRESSING
OCEAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN AN EXTENDED
TERRITORIAL SEA
Earlier sections of this article identified constitutional and statutory ambiguities
created by the President's Proclamation unilaterally extending the U.S. territorial sea.
Investigation of these uncertainties revealed intergovernmental and interagency
conflicts that will require important policy decisions. In formulating an appropriate
management regime, the legislative branch must consider the following issues:
equity, political feasibility, management capability, technical merit, and administra-
tive complexity tm
Under the heading of equitable considerations, it is important to note that
180,000 square miles of new "stateless" U.S. territory (approximately the size of
Texas) was created by the Territorial Sea Proclamation.m Nearly all previous
expansions of United States territory have led to statehood or incorporation into
existing states. The five current exceptions are island communities that have local
governments as authorized by Congress, either as a commonwealth (Commonwealth
of the Northern Mariana Islands, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico) or a territory
(Guam, Virgin Islands, American Samoa). In only a few instances has federally
acquired territory remained totally in federal hands. Midway, Johnston, and Wake
Islands are administered by the Department of Defense; these sites are exceptional
because they are quite small, resources are not being developed there, and they are
of national security value. The uninhabited guano islands of Navassa, Swan,
Howland, Baker, and Jarvis can also be distinguished because of their relative
isolation. These islands lack an obvious administrative body other than the federal
government; the same can be said for Palmyra and Kingman Reef. The extended
territorial sea is very different from these situations.
222. See, e.g., Letter from Robert W. Knecht to Marc Hershman et aL, regarding a Western States
Territorial Sea Study (March 11, 1989) (on file with the authors).
223. See Extension of the Territorial Sea: Hearings on H.R. 1405 Before the Subcomm. on
Oceanography and Great Lakes of the House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Comm., 101st Cong., 1st
Sess. 64, 65 (March 21, 1989) (Statement of Chris A. Shafer, Chairman, Coastal States Organization)
[hereinafter CSO Testimony].
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Several commentators have argued convincingly that control over the extended
territorial sea is now a purely domestic question, despite the fact that national
security interests prompted President Reagan to expand the U.S. territorial sea to
twelve miles.2' The extended territorial sea is undeniably linked to the adjacent
coastal states. These states have direct and inherent interests in the management of
adjacent seas. The impacts of ocean development affect these states on ecological,
social, economic, and political levels. Under the current regulatory scheme, the
burdens of development appear to be falling disproportionately upon the coastal
states.
A proper consideration of political feasibility and administrative complexity
must first acknowledge existing inadequacies in federal ocean management. Present
inefficiencies in coastal and ocean management have produced conflicts that have
delayed the orderly survey and development of promising ocean resources.
According to Biliana Cicin-Sain and Robert Knecht, this growing intergovernmental
complexity and conflict exists because priorities have not been established .2 " The
polarized efforts of development and conservation interest groups have created a
disjointed approach to management that lacks both clearly articulated over-arching
policies and coordination among the several agencies with planning and management
224. Although the following two statements were made with regard to the 200-mile exclusive
economic zone, they apply afortiori to the extended territorial sea.
In a study prepared by the Coastal States Organization, COASTAL STATES AND THE U.S. EXCLUSIVE
ECONOMIC ZONE [hereinafter CSO STUDY] (April 1987), it was stated that the question of how to manage
the resources of the EEZ is an internationally recognized sovereign (i.e., domestic) matter. "In terms of
U.S. federal law, this is a fundamental change with potentially profound domestic consequences." Id. at
14.
In Bruce A. Harlow & Richard Grunawalt, Recognition of Hawaiian Jurisdiction and Control Over
the Resources in its Exclusive Economic Zone: Challenge and Opportunity (Report to the State of Hawaii,
January 1986) [hereinafter HARLOW REPORT], the authors argue that the separation of the EEZ resource
regime from other rights recognized in the international community has invalidated the premise upon
which federal dominance was founded.
Also, in Edward A. Fitzgerald, The Tidelands Controversy Revisited, 19 ENVTIL L 209, 253 (1988),
it was noted that international considerations were irrelevant to the domestic purposes of the Submerged
Lands Act. Resource management that does not conflict with the rights of other nations is, therefore, a
wholly internal matter.
225. Biliana Cicin-Sain & Robert Knecht, The Problem of Governance of U.S. Ocean Resources and
the New Exclusive Economic Zone, 15 OcEAN DEV. & INT'L L 289, 301 (1985).
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responsibilitiesY' The problem of clashing legal mandates was well illustrated
when local governments seeking to enforce air quality standards onshore under the
Clean Air Act were unable to control air emissions from offshore oil and gas
projects that are solely regulated by Interior under the OCSLA.'
Robert Knecht, Biliana Cicin-Sain, and Jack Archer' warn that undue delay,
or outright failure to act, will prolong existing confusion and undermine the
effectiveness of existing federal ocean law. Similarly, the American Bar
Association's Law of the Sea Committee presented a unified call for congressional
action in order to ensure the orderly, uniform implementation of the territorial sea
extension.' In other words, the state of national ocean policy requires that some
form of change be implemented. The question is which of several approaches
should be taken?
The technical merit and management capability of the different proposals for
ocean resource management are evaluated in the remainder of this article. The
political feasibility and administrative complexity of each approach are also
addressed, where appropriate.
226. John Noyes, United States of America PresidentialProclamation No. 5928: A 12-Mile Territorial
Sea, 4 INT'L J. EsTuARINE & COASTAL L. 142 (1989), citing Robert Knecht, Biliana Cicin-Sain & Jack
Archer, National Ocean Policy: A Window of Opportunity, 19 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L 113 (1988).
227. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7626 (1988).
228. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1357 (1988). See generally, Knecht, Cicin-Sain & Archer, supra note 226,
at 122. The authors cite the Secretary of Commerce's Findings and Decisions in the Matter of the Appeal
by Exxon Co., USA to the Consistency Objection by the California Coastal Commission to EXXON's
Proposed Development of the Santa Ynez Unit by Means of Development Option A (February 18, 1984).
Section 328(a)(3) of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7627(a)(3) (1991 Supp.), now authorizes states
adjacent to an OCS source to regulate emissions, subject to federal approval. The U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency retains concurrent enforcement authority.
229. Id. at 125.
230. LAW OF THE SEA COMMrrT NEVwSLErER: Section of International Law and Practice, vol. 3,
no. 2 (American Bar Association, Sumnmer 1989).
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A. Coastal State Control
"It is neither feasible nor desirable for the national government to attempt to
represent all of the public interests in ocean activities beyond the territorial sea.""
This position, adopted by the Coastal States Organization (CSO), is tied directly to
its interpretation of the following Executive Order on Federalism issued by President
Reagan: "In the absence of clear constitutional or statutory authority, the presump-
tion of sovereignty should rest with the individual states. Uncertainties regarding the
legitimate authority of the national government should be resolved against regulation
at the national level.' 2  Although the CSO tempered its recommendation to
include the possibility of an equal federal-state partnership, it implicitly considered
primary state control to be the way to govern the extended territorial sea for the
broadest and best public good.233
The demonstrated competence of coastal states in managing both living and
nonliving resources in the adjoining ocean justifies extension of state authority to
twelve miles. In its testimony to Congress, the CSO provided a lengthy account of
the coastal states' wide-ranging experience in ocean resource management.? The
231. From a Policy Statement of the Coastal States, appended to CSO Testimony, supra note 224.
232. CSO Testimony, supra note 224, at 73, referring to Executive Order No. 12612 (October 26,
1987).
233. Id. at 14.
234. [A]I states bordering the territorial sea have statutes governing mineral exploration and mining
on State lands.... Ten States are currently participating with the Interior Department in joint
federal-state task forces.... The Governors of American Samoa, Guam, the Commonwealth
of Northern Marianas Islands and Hawaii have completed an assessment of the importance of
the resources in the 200 mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) off their shores, and are in the
process of establishing an EEZ Coordinating Council. For the last twelve years the coastal
States have cooperated with the federal government and the private sector ... [under] the
Magnuson Fishery and Conservation and Management Act.
Some coastal States have long-standing laws for the development of oil and gas resources
within their coastal and territorial waters, .... long-standing expertise in a variety of pollution
programs,... coastal or ocean sanctuary programs.... [29] States, and possibly 30 by next
year, have federally approved coastal zone management programs. Historic shipwrecks have
been managed by many coastal states for years, and under the Historic Shipwreck Act of 1988
all coastal States are now managing these "national treasures."
(continued...)
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testimony mentioned several areas of demonstrated coastal state ability, including
ocean mining, fisheries management, joint federal-state task forces, pollution control,
sanctuary programs, and coastal zone management. "[F]rom the perspective of Great
Lakes States, States can and have managed aquatic resources very successfully over
areas extending far beyond twelve miles. "235
Suzanne Iudicello testified before the House Committee on Oceanography and
Great Lakes that the State of Alaska has demonstrated particular competence in
balancing the goals of protection, conservation, and utilization through joint efforts
with the U.S. State Department to reduce foreign interception of salmon; through
exclusive management of shelf commercial rockfish, king and tanner crab, and troll
salmon in federal waters (spending ten times the outlay of the federal government
in the management of its regional fisheries); and through accumulated negotiation
experience with other states and foreign nations with regard to anadromous
234. (...continued)
Several states have developed specific ocean resource policy or management initiatives.
For example, North Carolina in 1984 completed a comprehensive ocean policy analysis, and
is presently preparing a report on the economic feasibility of mining phosphorate deposits..
. Oregon is in the midst of preparing an ocean resources management plan.... Hawaii has
legislatively authorized... implementation of an updated Ocean Resources Management Plan.
., has also initiated a program to evaluate potential impacts of marine mining industry, and
has prepared an environmental impact statement on ocean mining for the recovery of cobalt-
rich manganese crsts off its shores. Legislation is pending in the legislatures of Alaska and
California to inventory ocean resources and establish state ocean management programs.
Since entering the Union the Great Lakes States have had exclusive management
authority over extensive areas of water and submerged lands, and the aquatic resources found
there... the shortest State territorial water boundary is 21 miles offshore of Pennsylvania in
Lake Erie ... Michigan ... manages resources out, irn some locations, more than 72 miles.
[and] alone owns 37,500 square miles of submerged lands.
Thus from the perspective of Great Lakes States, States can and have managed aquatic
resources very successfully over areas extending far beyond 12 miles. Further, we have done
so in concert with a foreign country... the intemational institutions created by the Great
Lakes States and Canada are testimony to our ability to manage our own resources.
Id. at 11-12.
235. Id. at 12.
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species.2  Further testimony indicated that the management capability of the
Alaskan government has also been superior to that of the federal government in
some instances. The Alaskan government has issued nine active and 200 prospective
ocean mining leases off the Alaskan coast; the federal government has not issued
any. The Alaskan government also has a two-to-three year waiting period for a
predictable and consistent leasing schedule, while it takes five years for an oil and
gas lease sale to be issued in the three-to-twelve mile zone. In addition to reducing
administrative complexity (to the benefit of oil companies), Alaskan management
incorporates better environmental protection of the area. With regard to oil and gas
development, "Alaska can more efficiently and competently manage this resource in
the three-to-twelve mile zone than can the federal government. '
Alaska also cites, through Iudicello, the sound policy behind the 1953
Submerged Lands Act grant, stating that state ownership of the extended territorial
sea is equally valid. Furthermore, unified jurisdiction and ownership of the zero-to-
twelve mile zone makes sense for the coherent exercise of police power. Otherwise
enforcement can be complicated by the cross-purposes of federal and state agencies.
To avoid the problems of interstate squabbles, where each state seeks to protect its
own resources at the expense of other states, minimum federal standards could be
developed. If these standards were also required to be consistent with state law,
enforcement would be greatly enhanced.2m
B. Coastal States As Equal Managing Partners
As noted above, many coastal states have been willing to devote money and
talent to ocean resource management; the success of their efforts illustrates that some
states are quite competent to manage the vast resources of an extended territorial sea.
The variation in need among the coastal states, however, might warrant legislation
providing for optional participation by states in the planning and management of the
236. Extension of the Territorial Sea: Hearings on H.R. 1405 Before the House Comm. on
Oceanography and Great Lakes of the House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Comm., 101st Cong., 1st
Sess. 82, 85 (March 21, 1989) (statement by Suzanne ludicello, Associate Director for Fisheries and the
Environment for Alaska).
237. Id. at 5.
238. See McCoy, supra note 205, at 46.
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three-to-twelve mile zone.' 9 Optional participation by a state that has demonstrat-
ed ocean management capacity would be consistent with the principles of the Coastal
Zone Management Act. For coastal states like Hawaii, Alaska, Oregon, Washington,
Louisiana, and Texas, and for territories like American Samoa and Guam, the
existence of important resources and interests highlights the need to develop a
management program. Coastal states with few resources or uses of immediate
interest, however, may not have a compelling need for altering the present arrange-
ments.
Governor John Waihee of Hawaii has stated his belief that the two portions of
the territorial sea should be part of an integrated management process that is guided
by a single comprehensive set of coastal policies. A necessary element of state
control would be the elimination of the existing regime's arbitrary (three-mile)
jurisdictional boundariesW Waihee reports several examples of Hawaii's
leadership role in integrating ocean development to support the state's position: the
existing local partnership between the state and its counties, an agreement signed
with the Secretary of Interior initiating the nation's first joint federal-state
management program regarding mineral resources in the EEZ, and the cooperation
between state/federal governments and the private sector in the development of
ocean science and technology at the Natural Energy Laboratory on the Island of
Hawaii. 4
On equitable grounds, the people of Hawaii feel that culturally, historically, and
economically, the ocean is theirs to value, respect, and nurture. National security
and international navigational interests are recognized, but these interests are
consistent with Hawaii's legitimate concerns: the proper stewardship of renewable
resources, a fair return on the use of the ocean and its resources, the regulation of
ocean activities to protect public health and welfare, and planning for future use of
ocean resources and the growth of Hawaii's economy."4 There is no need to bind
239. Ocean Issues: Hearings on Reauthorization of the Coastal Zone Management Act, Hard Mineral
Resources in the Exclusive Economic Zone, Fisheries Issues, and Extension of the Territorial Sea Before
the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 101st Cong., 2nd Session 86, 92 (Honolulu,
January 8, 1990) (Statement of John Waihee, Governor, State of Hawaii) [hereinafter Waihee Statement].
240. Id. at 92.
241. Id. at 89.
242. Id. at 88.
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security and navigation to other interests in the ocean which can be more effectively
managed by the state that is most directly affected by them. In any event, "without
effective local participation in the decision-making process, no amount of 'national
interest' justification is likely to overcome local opposition.""
Other studies indicate that participation is not an impossible goal. A study of
federal consistency under the CZMA' noted that the requirement of federal-state
cooperation in coastal management has resulted in states concurring with 97% of all
federal consistency applications.2S The figures presented provide reason to be
optimistic about the potential for increased federal-state cooperation. Nonetheless,
the authors concluded that the consistency requirement "should not be viewed as a
general bromide for dealing with the fragmentation of management authority," but
rather as a modest experiment in mandating interagency and intergovernmental
coordination.' The approach should be seen simply as leading to more specific
analysis of the conditions and techniques that result in genuine collaboration.
Criticism by the federal government of undue administrative complexity and
inconvenience, created by increased state participation, will be outweighed by the
environmentally sound decisions that result from increased review. The interactions
between coastal states and their adjacent oceans clearly demand a prominent state
role in management of the extended territorial sea. Governor Waihee of Hawaii
suggests the creation of a "federal ocean resources council" consisting of the key
ocean agencies, such as the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Association, the
Environmental Protection Agency, the Department of Interior, and the Department
of Defense. 7 The council would be convened by NOAA, as needed, to assist
states in the development of management programs for the extended territorial sea.
The operation of this council would improve coordination at the federal level, the
243. ROBERT W. KNECHT, THIE COASTAL STATES AND THE U.S. ExcLuSIvE EcoNoMIc ZONE 15
(CSO, Washington, D.C. 1987).
244. Lowry, Jarman, & Maehara, supra note 188.
245. Id. at 38.
246. Id. at 39.
247. Waihee Statement, supra note 239, at 93.
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lack of which has made it difficult for states to work with the federal government
on ocean and coastal matters in the past.
In the Coastal States Organization study mentioned previously, the Deepwater
Ports ActP and the Ocean Thermal Energy Act"9 are cited as setting the prece-
dent for shared decision-making." The concept of "shore-linked" impacts of
ocean development provides the basis for gauging the roles of the state and federal
governments in ocean management. In the past, the interests of the states and local
communities have usually been projected from the shoreland seaward, and
terminated arbitrarily at the boundary of state ocean waters. A more appropriate
approach, however, is to start from the location of the activities and project the
effects and impacts shoreward to the state coastal zone and shorelands. Long-term
commitments for the exclusive use of ocean space, and the resultant long-term
commitment of the shoreside support facilities, require the concurrent approval of
both the federal government and the involved coastal states."1
C. Regional Management
A modified alternative to federal-state cooperation is the formation of new, and
the expansion of existing, regional management schemes. A blue-ribbon panel
review of the MFCMA resulted in a recommendation that cooperative management
through regional councils be retained, but proposed separate fishery conservation and
allocation determinations" 2 Under the modified scheme, conservation determi-
nations would be made by NOAA and allocation decisions by the regional councils.
By counteracting the administration's refusal to share decision-making authority with
coastal states, increased participation would significantly reduce tension between the
248. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1501-24 (1988).
249. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9101-67 (1988).
250. CSO STUDY, supra note 224, para. 2, at 20.
251. Id. at 21.
252. Knecht, Cicin-Sain & Archer, supra note 226, at 126.
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federal government and the states. The policy stalemate in oil and gas development
might have been avoided if the coastal states were given greater authority. 3
Efforts to implement regional cooperation should be carefully formulated to
avoid compounding the already fragmented ocean management regime. Information
sharing and coordination must be promoted. In attempting to balance national and
regional interests, including the costs and benefits of ocean activities, the manage-
ment framework should also have the capability of ranking specific uses and
resources when necessary.'
D. Multiple-Use Approach
The complex nature of the ocean as an interdependent ecological system
provides much of the reasoning behind a third alternative, multiple-use management.
The multiple use approach requires the establishment of clear legislative guidelines,
possibly even priorities, to govern ocean management. For example, Oregon has
crafted an integrated regime for nearshore ocean management that includes
legislatively-set priorities, favoring living over nonliving marine resources in cases
where multiple use conflicts occur. 5 Possibilities on the national level include
creation of a multiple-use federal oceans agency (or federal regional commissions)
for ocean management.' This entity would have plenary authority analogous to
that of the Corps of Engineers in the Coastal Decision Framework.' It would
253. Id. at 125-26.
254. Cicin-Sain & Knecht, supra note 225, at 315. See Alexander & Hanson, Regionalizing Exclusive
Economic Zone Management, in PROCEEDINGS OF OCEANS, 1984 (Marine Technology Society, 1984),
and Gather, A Public Authority to Manage the Atlantic Outer Continental Shelf, 2 COASTAL ZONE MGT.
J. 59-64 (1975) for other versions of the regional approach.
255. Knecht, Cicin-Sain & Archer, supra note 226, at 133, citing JAMES GOOD & RICHARD G.
HI.DRETH, NEARSHORE OCEAN MANAGEMENT IN OREGON (Oregon Department of Land, Conservation
and Management, draft 1986).
256. Cicin-Sain & Knecht, supra note 225, at 312, Table 2.
257. The structure of the coastal decision framework involves decisionmaking at all three levels of
government and involves multiple agencies within each level. Certain agencies have primary power over
certain aspects of a decision, but only a secondary role in other aspects of the decision. The Army Corps
of Engineers provides the balance of power as the ultimate decision authority. Over the years, the coastal
(continued...)
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provide the forum for integrating the preferences of many special purpose agencies
and interests.'
Ocean resources and processes are highly fluid, mobile, and intertwine over
great distances. It is clear that a mismatch currently exists between the realities of
the ocean system and the government's sectoral approach to its management.
Instances of split or shared authority persist. For example, the Department of the
Interior has jurisdiction over sea turtles while on land, but NOAA has jurisdiction
over them in the ocean." Because many of the most important ocean activities
traverse or impact all three jurisdictions (local, state and federal governments),
complexity is added to the planning and management of these activities. Further-
more, the benefits and costs of ocean resources exploitation frequently fall dispropor-
tionately on different jurisdictions, exacerbating inter-jurisdictional frictions.
The lack of a plenary law for ocean decision-making creates an organizational
vacuum in the ocean arena. An important policy objective should be to fill this
vacuum; the Corps of Engineers' public interest review process is the best model we
have.' The Corps of Engineers has general jurisdiction over coastal waters, and
reviews all discharges of dredged or filled materials. 2 The public interest review
process requires consideration of diverse factors, applying a balancing test to assure
that the benefits of a proposed action outweigh the foreseeable detriments. The
process is open to all public and private organizations and individuals. By law the
257. (...continued)
decision process has developed norms to guide decisions based on constitutional, public trust and
environmental principles reflecting the prevalent societal values of the times.
258. Marc J. Hershman, The CoastalDecision Making Framework as a Modelfor Ocean Management,
in PROCEEDINGS, supra note 182, at 92, 99.
259. Cicin-Sain & Knecht, supra note 225, at 299.
260. Knecht, Cicin-Sain & Archer, supra note 226, at 134.
261. Hershman, supra note 258, at 96.
262. Garrett Power, The Fox in the Chicken Coop: The Regulatory Program of the US. Army Corps
of Engineers, 63 VA. L REv. 503, 547 (1977).
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Corps must integrate the objectives of a wide range of federal and state laws.'
The Corps acts as a clearinghouse to ensure that conflicts are identified and resolved
among the real parties in interest, requiring participants to try to resolve their
differences through negotiation and project modification.' The mutual education
and trading of information often facilitates trade-offs or at least the establishment of
guidelines for addressing problems that may arise in the future. A general and
flexible system will allow regional experimentation and trial and error that will lead
to a system that arises out of real decisions and real circumstances.'
In addition to the problems of split and shared authority, numerous other faults
in the present ocean management system can be recited. Examination of conse-
quences to proposed ocean uses is biased toward protection or development
depending upon the particular law in question. Decisionmakers have few
opportunities to debate overall priorities or to make trade-off decisions. No one has
jurisdiction over conflicts among different sectors (e.g., controversies surrounding
the Santa Barbara Channel, the Beaufort Sea, and the Georges Bank). Litigation
addresses only actual rather than potential conflict, often excludes crucial viewpoints
because of narrowly defined rules of evidence, and involves damaging delays.
Decisionmakers are not encouraged to conduct advanced ocean planning. And
finally, the difficulty of estimating the impact of long-range activities often leads to
the preclusion of some uses and species from the ocean management regime.'
In addition to the need to address organizational defects, the United States needs
to understand better the interactions between marine ecosystems and the impacts of
certain ocean activities, and also of the cumulative impacts resulting from multiple
ocean uses. At the very least, appropriations should be made to support the pursuit
of such knowledge. Meanwhile, to minimize the uncertainty caused by the
complexity of ocean processes, operationally-linked monitoring programs could be
used for new and existing ocean uses. After performing baseline studies, agreement
should be reached among the potentially affected interests on thresholds that trigger
pre-agreed changes in the operation of an activity. This approach would eliminate
263. Hershman, supra note 258, at 94-95.
264. Cicin-Sain & Knecht, supra note 225, at 302-05.
265. Hershman, supra note 258, at 96.
266. Cicin-Sain & Knecht, supra note 225, at 302-305.
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the problems caused by the inflexibility inherent in earlier governmental management
procedures.?
The multiple-use approach will not be easy to implement and will take time to
become fully operational. It has been recommended, therefore, that realistic field
testing of regional approaches (discussed supra) might serve as a stepping stone
toward the greater goal of multiple-use ocean management. This approach may
not reduce complexity in ocean management, but it may reflect all that we can
expect in a pluralistic society and under a federalist system of government, where
democratic principles prevail.
E. Revenue Sharing
Another way to placate coastal state opposition to federal management of the
extended territorial sea is to share the revenues obtained from resource exploitation
in the area. A proposal by Richard Littleton calls for sharing with all 50 statese °
Reallocation of resources would not change fundamental federal-state rights and
duties, and a consequential increase of ocean awareness will necessarily result in
better monitoring of oil and gas production. This approach would provide an
immediate and more concrete mechanism for organizing the coastal zone than an
abstract framework for future federal-state cooperation. Establishing a single
decisionmaker out to twelve miles could directly resolve some federal-state tensions,
while reducing the intensity of other disputes by moving the focus of tension twelve
miles from shore.
In general, the states are clearly capable of managing the area. Extended
management is practiced by the Great Lakes states, Alaska, Florida, Texas, and
Puerto Rico. Active state participation in the administration of the oceans, coupled
with a positive program to mobilize coastal states' industrial bases - which
facilitates the recovery and processing of offshore resources -- could provide the
267. CSO STUDY, supra note 224, para. 2, at 21.
268. Cicin-Sain & Knedt, supra note 225, at 315.
269. Hershman, supra note 258, at 99.
270. See Littleton, supra note 195 and accompanying text.
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basis for equitable federal-state sharing of revenuesY Hawaii's Governor, John
Waihee, has advocated a 50/50 division between the federal government and the
adjacent state for oil and gas development as well as hard minerals. 2  The
fundamental role of the coastal state in such an arrangement would be to provide a
cost-effective and reasonably flexible regulatory scheme that reduces the multiple
permit burden to a minimum2 3 This reduction in administrative complexity alone
might be enough to rally the support of industry and allow the states to present a
unified proposal for congressional action.
F. Statutory Modification and Other Action
The National Governors Association and Western Governors have issued
resolutions suggesting that Congress mandate that each federal ocean agency analyze
the legislation governing its programs and make a determination as to the extent to
which this legislation should be interpreted to extend to the twelve-nautical-mile
limit of the territorial sea. 74 Congress could then either accept and confirm
executive branch interpretations or modify the particular pieces of legislation to
conform to Congressional intentions. See also Section III of this article entitled "A
Survey of Statutes Referring to the Territorial Sea" for suggested modifications.
Other issues identified27 as topics requiring attention include the removal of
gaps in the regulatory schemes involving hard minerals and ocean incineration;
providing for the identification of potential conflict; establishment of NOAA as an
independent agency; amendment of the OCSLA to provide greater protection for
marine and coastal resources and uses; and the incorporation of conflict resolution,
negotiation and joint planning procedures.
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G. Conclusion
The resolution of intergovernmental and interagency conflicts is crucial to the
goal of efficient management of ocean resources. Although our understanding of
ocean processes is still far from complete, it is clear that our first generation
approach to management has become overloaded. The Territorial Sea Proclamation
provides a compelling opportunity to address the need for reform. Equitable
considerations require that the federal government share with the states the decision-
making authority it has assumed in the extended territorial sea.
The possible approaches to improving our national ocean management effort
presented in this article are as follows:
(A) increase state control to twelve miles--state ownership would be subject
only to the federal navigational servitude for the constitutional purposes of
commerce, navigation, national defense, and international affairs;
(B) create a partnership between the federal government and the willing and
capable coastal states;
(C) promote regional cooperative management schemes--analogous to the
MFCMA regional councils;
(D) pursue a multiple use approach-where competing values are balanced
by a federal oceans agency with plenary authority over U.S. waters;
(E) develop a revenue-sharing scheme in which federal dominion would be
maintained and the states would be placated with a secure source of funds;
and
(F) modify statutes individually, but comprehensively.
The individual policy approaches listed above are not meant to be exhaustive,
nor mutually exclusive. They are recommendations to be considered in formulating
an appropriate response to the territorial sea extension. Until some comprehensive
action of this sort is taken, the potential for development of this important area will
never be achieved.
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